These contracts have not undergone an independent security audit.

They are published so the protocol can be inspected, forked and learned from — not as a warranty of correctness, and not as a service anyone operates.

This repository publishes no contract addresses and no deployment. There is no canonical instance, nothing operated by anyone, and nothing to interact with. It is source you deploy yourself.

That is deliberate. A published address on unaudited, upgradeable code is an invitation to trust an operator, and there is no operator here.

If you deploy your own instance, you do so entirely at your own risk. Read Trust assumptions and known limitations first — the owner of a deployment is fully privileged, and that owner will be you.

If you are considering an audit or a formal review and want context on the design, open a discussion — help is welcome.

Do not open a public issue, pull request or discussion for a security vulnerability.

Report it through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting — the Security tab, then Report a vulnerability. That opens a private advisory only you and the maintainers can see.

Please include:

• a description of the issue and the impact you believe it has;
• the affected contract, function and — if known — the deployment;
• steps to reproduce, ideally a failing test or a Hardhat script;
• any suggested mitigation.

We will credit you in the advisory unless you ask us not to. There is no formal bug bounty program at this time.

Please give us reasonable time to ship a fix before disclosing publicly.

Note that a report here can only ever result in a fix to the source. This project operates no deployment, so there is nothing anyone here can pause or patch on your behalf — see There is no deployment. If you find a live instance under attack, contact whoever deployed and operates it.

Security fixes land on main and nowhere else. There are no long-term support branches, and no deployed instance is maintained or updated.

These are properties of the current design, not undisclosed bugs. Read them before deploying or interacting with this protocol.

Launchpad is a UUPS proxy whose _authorizeUpgrade is guarded only by onlyOwner. The owner can:

• replace the implementation with arbitrary code, which means the owner can unilaterally take control of every token, curve and balance held by the contract;
• pause all trading (setIsMarketPaused);
• change the fee recipient and the fee rate up to 100% (setFeeParams);
• change the creator reward shares (setRewardParams);
• change the price feed, the wrapped-native address and the DEX addresses;
• change the supply and reserve parameters that determine launch pricing.

There is no timelock and no on-chain enforcement of a multisig owner. Ownership is whatever address called initialize. Anyone deploying this protocol for real use should transfer ownership to a multisig behind a timelock. Users should treat any deployment as fully trusted-owner until proven otherwise, and verify who the owner actually is before depositing funds.

At migration the full-range LP position is minted to feeParams.feeRecipient, not burned and not locked. The fee recipient can withdraw the migrated liquidity at any time. This is a deliberate design decision, not an oversight, but it is the single most important thing for a token buyer to understand: post-migration liquidity is custodial to the protocol operator.

Launch pricing is derived from a Chainlink-compatible feed via MarketUtils.calculateVirtualReserves. The current implementation reverts only on a zero answer — it does not check updatedAt for staleness or validate answeredInRound. A stale or misconfigured feed would skew the opening price of newly launched tokens. It does not affect tokens whose curve is already initialized, since virtual reserves are snapshotted at launch.

Payouts, refunds, and fee and reward distributions use payable(...).transfer(), which forwards a 2300 gas stipend. If the token creator or the fee recipient is a contract whose receive() costs more than that, the corresponding trade reverts. Use externally owned accounts, or simple forwarders, for those roles.

DexUtils.migrateToken mints the position with amount0Min and amount1Min set to zero, and creates the pool at a price derived from the final curve price. The buyer whose transaction happens to exhaust the bonding curve pays the gas for the entire migration.

Token.isLocked blocks all peer-to-peer transfers during the bonding-curve phase. Only the launchpad can be a counterparty. If a token never sells out its curve, it stays locked indefinitely — holders can still sell back to the curve, but the token will never trade anywhere else.

TokenUtils.validateTokenInfo checks lengths and URL prefixes only. Names, symbols, descriptions, logos and social links are attacker-controlled strings. Anything consuming TokenLaunched must treat them as untrusted input — impersonation of an existing project is trivial and is not prevented on-chain.

There is no allowlist, no KYC and no review step. Any address can launch any token at any time. Moderation, if any, happens off-chain in tokenzyme-core and does not affect on-chain state.