aph-jido is a draft example. It demonstrates how a jido agent can refuse to act on a signal that carries no APH notarization envelope, and it is scrupulous about the fact that the gate it demonstrates is structural, not cryptographic. Read the depth table in README.md before deciding what this protects.

Specifically, and to save you the trip: JidoAph.Guard checks a byte bound, a strict parse, an attestation-mode policy, and proof-chain structure. It verifies no signature, resolves no key, checks no validity window, consults no revocation status, and recomputes no body hash. An envelope this guard admits may be a forgery. That is not a defect to report — it is the documented boundary, and the demo's whole teaching point is that a structurally perfect forgery passes the guard and is caught only by the deep leg.

Do not deploy this as an authorization control.

If you find a flaw in this repository's own code — the guard admitting something its own documentation says it refuses, the sidecar reporting a tooling failure as a protocol verdict, a refusal that can be bypassed — open an issue on this repository. If it is sensitive enough that a public issue is the wrong first move, use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository instead.

Two classes of report belong somewhere else:

• Flaws in the APH protocol or its reference implementation belong to squillo/aph; see that repository's SECURITY.md and spec/security-considerations.md.
• Flaws in jido belong to agentjido/jido. Nothing here is maintained by that project.

This repository is a draft with no release, no Hex package, and no maintenance promise. Reports are welcome and will be read; nothing here guarantees a response time or a fix.