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chore(ci): fuzz Jazzer targets on relevant merges, tighten fuzzZipRead, add zip seeds - #416
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe ZIP-reading fuzz target now allows ChangesFuzzing input handling
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Other Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The fuzz workflow will not run nightly as described, and the checkout credential stays available to Maven build code. Neither change affects production behavior, but both should be fixed before merging. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 0.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 1 functions across 1 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Review comments at @.github/workflows/fuzz.yaml:
- Around line 8-16: Add a schedule trigger to the workflow alongside push and
workflow_dispatch, using a cron expression that runs nightly at 07:17 UTC.
- Line 37: Set persist-credentials to false on the actions/checkout step in the
fuzz workflow; this job runs Maven and does not need checkout credentials
afterward.
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…d, add zip seeds Add a workflow that runs each @fuzztest in Fuzzing for its full maxDuration, one matrix job per target, since Jazzer fuzzes one target per run. It does not run on pull requests: fuzzing takes ten minutes per target, which is too slow for the payoff on every change. It runs on pushes to main that touch sdk/src, a pom.xml, or the workflow itself, so merges that cannot change the fuzzed code do not spend runner time. A concurrency group coalesces bursts of merges into a single queued run of the latest commit. It can also be started by hand. The corpus Jazzer generates is cached per target and saved even when the run fails, so each run continues from the last. When a target finds something, the reproducing crash-* input and the surefire reports are uploaded as an artifact. fuzzZipRead swallowed IllegalArgumentException along with the expected InvalidZipException, so a reader that seeks to a corrupt offset instead of rejecting the archive passed silently. Only InvalidZipException, IOException, and JsonParseException (from parsing the .json entries) are now expected; anything else fails the fuzz target. Add seed archives covering structures the existing corpus does not reach: zip64 end of central directory records (full, entry-count-only, with trailing data, with a decoy signature in the comment), UTF-8 entry names, an empty archive, and a commons-compress Zip64Mode.Always archive. Ignore the .cifuzz-corpus directory that Jazzer writes during fuzzing runs. Refs: DSPX-5070 Signed-off-by: Dave Mihalcik <dmihalcik@virtru.com>
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…fields (DSPX-5103) (#418) Jira: https://virtru.atlassian.net/browse/DSPX-5103. This is the Java counterpart of DSPX-5102 / opentdf/platform#4202. ## Summary A hostile archive could hang `SDK.isTDF` / `TDF.loadTDF`, or make them throw unchecked exceptions that callers screening untrusted input don't catch. #398 already reads the central directory fields unsigned and bounds-checks the EOCD, zip64 locator, CD offset and entry count. This PR closes the remaining gaps: 1. **Extra-field loop.** The loop now walks the extra field record by record, and every step moves at least one 4-byte header forward. A record whose data size runs past the extra field is rejected with `InvalidZipException`, and so is a zip64 record too short for the values its sentinels promise. Fewer than 4 trailing bytes are ignored, as Go's `archive/zip` does. - Releases up to v0.18.0 read the data size signed, so `0xFFFC` becomes -4 and the loop spins forever on it (DoS). v0.19.0 reads it unsigned, which stops the hang, but on `main` an oversized data size still walks past the extra field (`isTDF` returns true for the `0xFFFC` shape), and a zip64 record too short for its sentinels has the missing values read from whatever follows it. 2. **Negative or out-of-range sizes and offsets.** Zip64 sizes and offsets above `Long.MAX_VALUE` are now rejected. Before, they read as negative, so `position(-1)` threw `IllegalArgumentException` or a size of -1 read the manifest as `""`. Also rejected: an extra field or file comment that runs past the central directory, and an entry whose local header offset or compressed size doesn't fit in it. The uncompressed size is still checked lazily (#398 reports a short entry as truncated). - **Data start.** The central directory can't see the local header's filename and extra field lengths, so `ZipReader` also checks, when it reads the local header, that the entry's data starts inside the archive. Before, an empty entry whose local header put its data past the end was never read and came back empty instead of failing. It now fails with `InvalidZipException`. - **Central directory extent.** Each central directory header is now bounded by the directory size the end of central directory record declares (plain or zip64), not by the end of the archive. #398 already rejects a directory that does not end exactly where the record after it starts (passing over that candidate during the end of central directory scan), so the size this PR holds headers to is always one that ends at that record. The entry count is bounded by the declared size. Before, an inflated filename length on the last header read the end of central directory record into the entry name. Every SDK release records this size exactly, so archives it wrote still read. Raised by CodeRabbit on #398. 3. **No manifest size cap, on purpose.** There is no fixed cap on manifest size because DSPX-4502 targets 50 TiB payloads, whose manifests exceed 1 GiB. A hostile declared size is handled by the archive bounds check (offset + compressed size <= `channel.size()`). Since #399 (DSPX-4584) the manifest is streamed into the parser rather than buffered whole. A manifest whose declared size runs past the archive fails either when the parser reaches the end of the archive or at the first non-JSON byte after the entry, so the parser never reads more than the archive holds. (An earlier commit in this PR added a 10 MiB cap. A follow-up commit removes it.) 4. **Typed failures.** - `TDF.loadTDF` and `SDK.readManifest` now go through the new `TDFReader.open` / `TDFReader.readManifest`. These turn container and manifest malformation into `SDK.MalformedTDFException`. The underlying causes are `InvalidZipException`, `IllegalArgumentException` and Gson's `JsonParseException`. (Gson already rethrows an `IllegalStateException` raised while parsing as `JsonSyntaxException`.) - `SDK.isTDF` also returns false for any other `RuntimeException`, as a commented backstop for its boolean contract. - A payload whose declared size runs past the end of the archive is only detected when it is read. `TDFReader.readPayloadBytes` now wraps that `InvalidZipException` as `SDK.MalformedTDFException` too, as `readManifest()` does for the manifest stream, instead of letting the unchecked zip exception escape. - `TDFReader.payload()` (and so the first `readPayloadBytes`) wraps the same `InvalidZipException`, raised when the payload's local header puts its data past the end of the archive. - New additive constructor: `MalformedTDFException(String, Exception)`. 5. **Null statement fields.** In an assertion statement, a JSON `null` for `format`, `schema` or `value` now reads as `null`. Before, `format` and `schema` threw `UnsupportedOperationException`, and `value` became the string `"null"`. An object or array `format` or `schema` is now a `JsonParseException`; numbers and booleans are still read as their string form. **Behavior change:** callers of `loadTDF` / `SDK.readManifest` that caught `IllegalArgumentException` or Gson exceptions for bad input will now get `SDK.MalformedTDFException` (an `SDKException`). `TDFReader`'s constructor itself is unchanged. A truncated payload now fails `Reader.readPayload` with `SDK.MalformedTDFException`. Before #398 it returned short data and failed with an `IllegalStateException` about the segment; on `main` it fails with a bare `InvalidZipException`. **Still open:** trusting `payload.isEncrypted = false` (DSPX-4748) is out of scope here and has not been fixed. ## Tests - New `HostileZips` test helper builds stored archives by hand, with 11 hostile central-directory shapes. The short zip64 record is followed by bytes that read as a size that fits, so only the zip64 record bound rejects it. - Every shape runs under a 5 s `assertTimeoutPreemptively` against: - `ZipReader`: `InvalidZipException` - `SDK.isTDF`: `false` - `SDK.readManifest`: `MalformedTDFException` - `TDF.loadTDF`: `MalformedTDFException` - Valid-archive controls: the unmodified hand-built archive, and a zip64 extra field placed among other records with trailing padding. - `loadTDF` tests for a manifest whose declared size runs past the archive (`MalformedTDFException` caused by `InvalidZipException`; the manifest opens a JSON comment so the streaming parser reads on to the end of the archive) and for invalid manifest JSON (not JSON, `[]`, wrong types, a statement with an object `format`). - `ZipReaderTest`: a filename running past the central directory is rejected; this fails against `main`'s reader. A declared directory size running into the next record (plain and zip64) is rejected too. That check comes from #398, so this test also passes on `main`; it guards the invariant the per-header bound relies on. - `ZipReaderTest.testEmptyEntryWhoseDataStartsPastTheEndIsRejected`: an empty entry whose local header filename length is `0xFFFF` fails `getData` with `InvalidZipException`. - `TDFReaderTest.openReportsAZipThatIsNotATDFAsMalformed`: a zip with no manifest, no payload, or a name listed twice fails `TDFReader.open` as `MalformedTDFException`, caused by `IllegalArgumentException`. - `TDFReaderTest.reportsATruncatedPayloadAsMalformed`: a payload whose declared size runs past the archive fails as `MalformedTDFException`, caused by `InvalidZipException`. - `TDFReaderTest.reportsAPayloadWhoseDataStartsPastTheEndAsMalformed`: both `payload()` and `readPayloadBytes` fail as `MalformedTDFException`, caused by `InvalidZipException`. - A test that reads an 11 MiB manifest whole, so a size limit can't creep back in. - `ManifestTest` tests for null and non-string statement fields. - The shapes are added as Jazzer seeds in `FuzzingInputs/fuzzZipRead` and `FuzzingInputs/fuzzTDF`, with `dspx5103-` names so they don't collide with the seeds #416 added on `main`. - Against `main`'s `ZipReader`, the `isTDF` and `ZipReader` shape loops fail (`isTDF` returns true for the `0xFFFC` shape), and so does the filename test. Removing the zip64 record bound, the `IllegalArgumentException` wrap in `TDFReader.open`, or the `InvalidZipException` wrap in `TDFReader.readManifest`, fails the corresponding new tests. ## Checks run (locally, JDK 21, compiling to release 11) - Rebased onto `main` after #388 (ML-KEM rewrap session keys). `mvn -o -pl sdk test -Denforcer.skip=true -Dmaven.antrun.skip=true`, plus the same with `-Dtest=Fuzzing` (its name doesn't match surefire's default pattern): **469 tests, 0 failures, 0 errors, 9 skipped** before the last commit (428 in the default run, 41 in `Fuzzing`; after it, `TDFReaderTest`, `ZipReaderTest`, `TDFTest` and `SDKTest` pass again; the skips were already there: FIPS, E2E, etc.). The `Fuzzing` run is the Jazzer seed regression, new seeds included. Proto codegen was skipped; generated sources came from an earlier build. - SonarCloud: the SonarCloud commits fix the two findings in this PR's code (cognitive complexity in `readCentralDirectoryFileHeader`, two throwing calls in one `assertThatThrownBy` lambda) and the two test `assert` statements that failed the quality gate, which predate this PR. Three redundant-`new byte[]` findings in `TDFTest` and a could-be-`final` field in `TDF` also predate it and are left alone. - Not run: the full `mvn clean verify -P coverage`, actual fuzzing (`-P fuzz`), the cmdline/examples modules, and xtest. <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> <!-- coderabbit-ai-generated:v1 --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **Bug Fixes** * Improved handling of malformed or damaged TDF files, with clearer errors when archives or manifests are invalid. * TDF detection now returns false for unexpected runtime errors encountered while reading an archive. * Manifest parsing now handles explicitly null fields as unset and rejects invalid non-primitive values for format and schema. * Improved validation of archive contents and boundaries to help prevent malformed files from causing hangs or incorrect reads. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> --------- Signed-off-by: Dave Mihalcik <dmihalcik@virtru.com>
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Related: DSPX-4589 (zip reader hardening, #398), DSPX-5070 (fuzzing in CI; this PR adds the CI job, and the PR replay and alerting are still to do there), DSPX-5073 (the
fuzzTDFNPE)Runs the Jazzer fuzz targets after merges to
mainthat touch the fuzzed code. Also tightens thefuzzZipReadtarget and gives it seeds for zip structures the existing corpus never reaches. No SDK code changes.Fuzzing in CI (
.github/workflows/fuzz.yaml)mainthat touchsdk/src/**, anypom.xml, or the workflow itself, plusworkflow_dispatch. Merges that can't change the fuzzed code, such as docs,cmdline, or examples, don't spend runner time. Aconcurrencygroup means a burst of merges queues a single run of the latest commit, and a run that's already fuzzing isn't cancelled. Not on pull requests: a real fuzz run takes the full 10-minutemaxDurationper target, which is too slow for the payoff on every change.@FuzzTest(fuzzZipRead,fuzzTDF), because Jazzer fuzzes one target per run.fail-fast: falsekeeps one target's result from cancelling the other.sdk/.cifuzz-corpus) is cached per target. It is saved even when a run fails, so each run continues from the last.crash-*input plus the surefire reports are uploaded asfuzz-findings-<target>. Fix the bug, then commit the input underFuzzingInputs/<target>/so that it replays.checks.yaml(buf auth,sdk-fips-bcinstalled for the default non-fips profile), with the same pinned actions.upload-artifactis newly pinned to v4.6.2.I ran the job's Maven commands locally. On a finding, the job fails and Jazzer writes the
crash-*file where the upload glob looks for it. The corpus lands at the cached path.fuzzTDFwill be red until the existingNullPointerException(DSPX-5073, see Caveats) is fixed. Jazzer replays the checked-in inputs before it starts fuzzing, and one of them already hits it.Zip fuzz target
fuzzZipReadno longer swallowsIllegalArgumentException. The harness used to catch it along withInvalidZipException, so a reader that seeks to a corrupt offset instead of rejecting the archive passed silently. It now expects only:InvalidZipException;IOException;JsonParseException, which comes from parsing the.jsonentries, not from the zip itself.Anything else fails the target.
Seven seed archives in
FuzzingInputs/fuzzZipRead/:seed-zip64: zip64 end of central directory record and locator;seed-zip64-entry-count-only: zip64 record where only the entry count needs it;seed-zip64-trailing-data: zip64 archive followed by trailing bytes;seed-zip64-comment-with-decoy-signature: a strayPK\5\6inside the comment;seed-plain-utf8-names: non-ASCII entry names with general purpose bit 11 set;seed-empty: a bare end of central directory record;seed-commons-zip64-always: written by commons-compress withZip64Mode.Always..cifuzz-corpus/is ignored. Jazzer writes its generated corpus there during fuzzing runs.Results
On
main(#415) with this change:JAZZER_FUZZ=1 mvn -pl sdk -am test -Dtest='Fuzzing#fuzzZipRead'ran for 10 minutes, about 426k executions, with no findings.mvn -pl sdk -am test -Dtest='Fuzzing#fuzzZipRead'passed 11/11 (the existing inputs plus the new seeds). It also passed 122/122 with the roughly 110 inputs generated by a 10-minute run against fix(sdk): DSPX-4589 zip64 EOCD sentinels, truncated archive detection, and UTF-8 entry names #398's reader added.With #398's reader, a 10-minute run (about 130k executions) also found nothing. Main is still exposed to the bugs #398 fixes, but they don't show up as exceptions, so this harness can't see them:
#398's unit tests cover those.
Caveats
Fuzzing. Surefire only picks up classes named like*Test, and the pom doesn't add an include. So outside the fuzz workflow, these seeds and the existingcrash-*inputs replay only when you run-Dtest=Fuzzingyourself. OncefuzzTDFis fixed, a cheap follow-up would replay the corpus on PRs, which takes about 3 seconds. It would need either renaming the class toFuzzingTestor adding a Surefire include.fuzzTDFcorpus fails onmain. Running-Dtest='Fuzzing#fuzzTDF'onmainhits aNullPointerExceptionatManifest.readManifest(Manifest.java:673).gson.fromJsonreturnsnullfor a manifest whose JSON isnullor empty, andreadManifestdereferences it before its own null checks. CI hides this for the reason above. It isn't fixed here; DSPX-5073 tracks it. Until it is fixed, thefuzzTDFjob fails, and because the workflow runs on push, that shows as a red check on themaincommits that trigger it.Summary by CodeRabbit