fix(drive-abci)!: record and check the nullifiers of shielding transitions (PV14) - #5014
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A token can own its own Orchard shielded pool from protocol version 14. `TokenConfiguration::V1` adds `hasShieldedPool`; contracts with the flag get a pool at `[Tokens, TOKEN_SHIELDED_POOLS_KEY, token_id]` laid out like the credit pool, and three batch token transitions (TokenShield, TokenUnshield, TokenShieldedTransfer) move tokens into, out of and inside it. The identity signs and pays the fee in credits; the token id, owner id and, for an unshield, recipient and amount are bound into the Orchard sighash; pool balances are a term of the token conservation check; touched pools have their anchors recorded and pruned at block end. The six shielded queries take an optional token_id, the proof verifier and SDK route on it, and DPP builders plus wasm bindings expose the new transitions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…riant StateError is encoded by variant position, so the new TokenShieldedPoolNotEnabledError must be the last variant rather than sit in the token block, or every later variant's wire discriminant shifts; the frozen-discriminant test now pins it at 101. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…rules Shielded notes belong to no identity account, so freezing and destroying frozen funds cannot reach them; a holder who expects a freeze simply shields first. A token with hasShieldedPool must therefore set freezeRules, unfreezeRules and destroyFrozenFundsRules to no action takers and no admins, so no later configuration update can enable them. Contract create and update reject anything else with TokenShieldedPoolIncompatibleRulesError (10277). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four more batch token transitions move tokens straight into or out of a token's Orchard pool while an identity still signs and pays credits: TokenMintToPool and TokenBurnFromPool follow the manual minting and burning rules (group actions store a digest of the notes so every signer commits to the same bundle), TokenClaimToPool releases a distribution into a note (a perpetual claim names the cycle-aligned moment it claims up to so the amount is provable), and TokenDirectPurchaseToPool pays credits for tokens delivered shielded. Outputs-only bundles bind nothing extra; a burn binds token id, owner id and amount into its sighash. The shielded verification fee is charged by the action transformers so CheckTx admission and block execution price a bundle identically. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… pay document token costs from a pool The PR now targets v4.3-dev, so the feature moves from protocol version 14 to 15: v15.rs is added with DRIVE_VERSION_V10 (genesis structure v4 and the token pool method versions), DRIVE_ABCI_METHOD_VERSIONS_V11 (anchor recording), DRIVE_ABCI_VALIDATION_VERSIONS_V11 and CONTRACT_VERSIONS_V7 (token configuration format 1); the v14 tables return to their released values and the pools root is inserted by transition_to_version_15, with a genesis-versus-upgrade equivalence test. TokenPaymentInfo gains a format version 1 carrying a TokenShieldedPayment: an Orchard spend bundle in the payment token's pool whose value balance is the document action's token cost. The document base action carries it, the transformer checks the amount against the document type's cost, state validation v1 skips the owner's balance checks and validates the pool side (pool exists, token not paused, anchor, unspent nullifiers, pool balance, proof bound to token, owner, contract, document and amount), and the lowering pays the cost out of the pool: to the contract owner's balance or out of the supply. CheckTx admits the bundle under the identity contract nonce like the batch token pool transitions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…nfo in the SDK TokenPaymentInfo lost Copy when format version 1 gained a bundle: the SDK document builders now clone it, TokenShieldedPayment gets the JSON and Value conversions the wasm wrapper macro expects, and the payment is boxed inside the payment info and the document base action so the enums holding them keep their size (clippy large_enum_variant). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…redit shielded pool Three top-level state transitions move tokens through a token's shielded pool with no identity anywhere: each carries an Orchard bundle in the token pool and a second spend bundle in the credit shielded pool that pays the fee, both authorized only by spend keys. TokenShieldedTransferWithShieldedFee (23) transfers inside the token pool (value balance zero), TokenUnshieldWithShieldedFee (24) moves an amount into an identity's token balance, and TokenPurchaseFromShieldedPool (25) buys tokens at the direct purchase price out of the credit pool and mints them into the token pool, crediting the contract owner. The token bundle's sighash binds the state transition type, the token id and the transparent fields; the fee bundle's sighash binds the type, the token id and a digest of the token bundle's actions, so the two cannot be re-paired. The minimum-fee validation pins the fee bundle's value balance to the two-bundle fee (compute_token_pool_paid_shielded_fee), execution is a pool-paid event, uniqueness is by the nullifiers of both bundles, and the transitions are gated on the token shielded pool protocol version. The wiring mirrors IdentityTopUpFromShieldedPool across dpp, drive, drive-abci and the wasm bindings; dpp gains builders for the three transitions, and the book documents the batch transitions, documents paid from the pool and the identity-less transitions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… purchase validator Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…rden the pool purchase builder A TokenBurnFromPool bundle's sighash bound the batch owner, but a group action pins the digest of the proposer's signed actions, so every confirmer must submit that bundle unchanged and its proof failed under the confirmer's identity: a group burn from the pool could never complete with two signers. The sighash now binds the burner: the batch owner for a direct burn, the stored group action's proposer for a confirmer. The builder refuses to prove a fresh bundle for another signer, since consensus would reject it as a modified group action. A drive-abci test runs a burn by a group of two with real proofs, including a substituted bundle being rejected. The identity-less purchase builder rejects a token count above i64::MAX before proving instead of overflowing on negation, and proves the outputs-only bundle once over the purchase sighash instead of proving a throwaway bundle first. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Preserve the current protocol 14 version tables and key restrictions while enabling token pools through new protocol 15 generations. Keep transition IDs, error discriminants, signature preimages and bindings consistent with the rebased base. Handle once-per-identity claims into pools, bind document payment fixtures to nonce-derived IDs, and include token pools in the GroveDB structure description and regression fixtures.
Defer proposer-bound group burn proofs for confirmations to stateful validation. Restore shipped contract generations and select new pool-aware validation and storage methods only from protocol 15. Keep the format activation gate before paid processing. Regenerate all DAPI clients for token pool query selectors and group events. Add admission, activation, storage, immutability, and cross-client serialization regression coverage.
…s and tidy the pool validators TokenMintToPool is refused where the configuration forbids the minter to choose the destination of minted tokens, since the notes' recipients are the minter's choice; a perpetual claim into the pool must name the moment it claims up to; the identity-less purchase treats a missing supply item as a corrupted state like its batch counterparts. The pool validators no longer read and bill a frozen-account check a pooled token cannot fail. CheckTx is asserted on every sighash-binding batch transition in the drive-abci tests, with the admission helper shared by the test modules. The identity-less anchor and nullifier checks reuse the batch helpers, the three credit-pool fee lowerings share one helper, inline module paths become imports, the document base transformer binds the token id once instead of unwrapping it, and the v15 doc names the burner rule. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…timates A contract update is estimated through the insert path, whose stateless existence read reports no pool, so every pooled token the contract already had was priced as a freshly created pool on each update. The insert generation now skips a pool that exists when estimating; a real insert never finds one. The drive test estimates both the registration and the update of a pooled contract and pins that the update estimate is the smaller. The three copies of the token configuration checks (format admitted, pool rules compatible) in the contract create and update basic structure generations and the pre-activation gate become one dpp helper. A perpetual claim into the pool is now covered end to end: refused without the moment it claims up to, and paying the accrued rewards into the pool with it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… pause every pool inflow Review round 4 on the token shielded pools: - `all_purchases_amount` now counts `DirectPurchaseToPoolAction`, so a buyer whose credits cover the fee but not the price is refused with `IdentityInsufficientBalanceError` before execution instead of failing the balance removal on the execution path (a Drive error that would have stalled block processing); pinned by a test. - Mint, claim and purchase into the pool check the token status, so pause covers every pool operation as the PR describes; the book says so. - The identity-less purchase transform splits the fee with `checked_sub` and refuses a price over the credits leaving the pool as a consensus error. - The seven pool transformers share `bump_with_errors` for their paid failures. - The pool total balance's read-modify-write documents its dependence on the one-transition batch cap; the missing minimum-notes floor for token pools is documented in the book. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The feature was written against v4.3-dev, where it opened protocol version 15. On v4.2-dev protocol version 14 is the unreleased version, so the change belongs in v14's own snapshot and there is no v15. Version tables follow released boundaries, not PRs: a second feature landing in the same unreleased protocol version amends that version's table constants rather than adding new ones, which would leave a constant referenced by no PLATFORM_V*. So CONTRACT_VERSIONS_V7, DPP_VALIDATION_VERSIONS_V6, DRIVE_ABCI_METHOD_VERSIONS_V11, DRIVE_ABCI_VALIDATION_VERSIONS_V11, DRIVE_CONTRACT_METHOD_VERSIONS_V5, DRIVE_TOKEN_METHOD_VERSIONS_V3, DRIVE_VERSION_V10 and PLATFORM_V15 are gone, folded into the V6/V5/V10/V4/V2/V9 constants v14 already selects. v14.rs gains the feature as a numbered changelog item and a `// changed:` note on each slot it moves. The same rule applies to an implementation generation that is still unreleased: the repository amends it in place rather than stacking another one on top (eight v14 features have amended data_contract_create's basic_structure v2, and the same holds for initialization v4, insert_contract v2 and update_contract v2). create_initial_state_structure v5, insert_contract v3, update_contract v3, both basic_structure v3 modules and validate_shielded_proof v2 are therefore folded into the v14 generation they extended, and transition_to_version_15 into transition_to_version_14. The three generations that supersede shipped (v13 and earlier) code stay as new modules: calculate_total_tokens_balance v1, document_base_transition_state_validation v1 and validate_token_config_update v1. TOKEN_SHIELDED_POOL_INITIAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION becomes 14, the three shielded-fee token transitions join the existing 14..=LATEST_VERSION bounds arm rather than an empty 15..=LATEST_VERSION range, the GroveDB structure description records the pools since 14, and the tests that pinned the pre-feature version move from 14 to 13. Every table amended here is reachable only from PLATFORM_V14; released versions keep the neutral backfills (None, 0, max_version 0), so no shipped behaviour moves. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… rules Two review findings were fixed without a test that would have caught them, and the version retarget left four test names naming a protocol version that no longer exists. A paid rejection writes to no token pool, so its token id must not reach the block-end anchor recorder: recording an anchor for a pool that was never created fails the read, and that error propagates out of run_block_proposal and aborts the whole proposal. The success path already asserted the pool is registered; the rejection path now asserts the set stays empty. CheckTx must also price the Orchard bundle before it agrees to verify it. The compute fee is charged where the action is built, which CheckTx does, so the balance CheckTx demands already contains it. The new test funds an identity past the preliminary batch minimum — which has no Orchard component, and otherwise rejects before the real estimate is ever reached — and exactly one compute fee short of the batch, then asserts the reported required balance covers the fee. Both tests were run against the unfixed code: dropping the SuccessfulExecution guard makes the first report the pool it must not have registered, and dropping the compute fee from the shield action transformer makes CheckTx admit a transition the identity cannot pay for. ✖ before each fix, ✔ after. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…st constants An audit of the token pool work turned up seven places where the code says something other than what it does. None changes behaviour. The frozen-discriminant tests are the load-bearing ones. `BasicError` is bincode-encoded positionally, and its test's own doc comment requires each new tail variant to get a line there; `TokenShieldedPoolIncompatibleRulesError` was appended to the enum without one, leaving 194 unpinned, so a later insertion above it would shift its wire discriminant unnoticed. `StateError` pins its three new variants but still carried the `the tail of the enum` marker on the variant that is no longer the tail. Both now say what is true. The structure fixture test had its expectation replaced by the same expression the fixture stamps the value with, so it could no longer catch an origin recorded under the wrong version; it goes back to the literal. The CheckTx affordability test is pinned with `>` rather than `>=`: the identity is funded with exactly one compute fee, so the required balance is strictly greater. `test_genesis_v14_...` had been inserted between the v11-to-v12 equivalence guard's doc comment and the test it documents, so a thirty-six line account of the `[ShieldedBalances]` subtree sat on the token pool test while the v12 test had none. The block is back where it belongs, and its development narration is now a statement of the mechanism instead. A token pool stores the same five items as the credit pool and was sizing them from its own copy of four constants. They now have one declaration: a divergence there would price one pool's writes wrong while the other stayed right. The enum-ordering rule on `StateError` was written as a `///` doc comment on one variant, where rustdoc renders it as that variant's description rather than a rule about the enum. It is a plain comment now, matching `BasicError`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ustive A catch-all arm in a consensus dispatcher does not report an error when a kind is missing — it reports success. `_ => continue` skips the proof of a batched transition that carries one, and `_ => return Ok(new())` declares a shielded transition valid without ever verifying it. Adding a transition kind later would compile cleanly and open the hole silently. Both dispatchers in the unreleased generation now name every kind they decline. A future kind that carries an Orchard bundle stops the build until someone gives it an arm, which turns a production hole into a compile error. The codebase already takes this position where a missed variant would matter, in `process_raw_state_transitions`: "Deliberately exhaustive: a new execution result variant must make an explicit savepoint decision here." Behaviour is unchanged. The enumerations were verified by the compiler, which accepts neither a missing nor an unreachable pattern, so the set of kinds that fall through is exactly what it was. The two matching arms in the shipped generations are deliberately left alone: `validate_shielded_proof` v0 and `validate_minimum_shielded_fee` generation 0 are selected by protocol versions 13 and below, where a shipped file must stay byte-identical to what consensus already ran. Neither is a live hole there — the kinds they would fall through on are refused by `is_allowed` before any proof path is reached. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…its own Each token pool reads and writes through a path built from its token id, so a twin that supplied the wrong path would let one token's anchor authorize another token's spend, or one pool's spend make a note unspendable in every other pool. Nothing in the suite pinned that: no test used two tokens, and the unknown-anchor test spends against an anchor recorded in no pool at all, so it passes whether the lookup reads this token's tree, another token's, or the credit pool's. Two tests cross the boundary. The first records an anchor in a second token's pool and requires the spend against it to still be refused. The second spends a note in one pool and requires the nullifier to read as unspent in the other. Both were run against a deliberately broken path builder that ignores the token id, and both fail there; the unknown-anchor test passes under the same defect, which is the gap they close. The second contract is owned by a second identity because a contract id derives from its owner — with one owner the helper hands back the same contract, both tokens share a pool, and the tests prove nothing. An assertion pins that too, and it is what caught this while writing them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… itself on The chapter said a shielded note cannot be frozen, destroyed "or even seen", and that shielded activity is not recorded publicly. Both overstate what the pool hides, and the same chapter documents the queries that disprove them: `getShieldedEncryptedNotes` returns the note ciphertexts, and the pool's spent nullifiers, note count and anchors are all in state. What a pool actually hides is the owner and the amount, not the existence of a note or of the operation. An issuer reading this needs the distinction to hold: it is the reason freeze rules must be disabled, and it is also the reason a pool is not by itself privacy. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ools A token pool and the credit pool own separate storage and describe their own subtrees differently, which is correct. They also both describe the GroveDB root `[]`, because both traverse it to reach that storage, and there they disagreed: the credit pool reports three levels with sum trees among the subtrees, the token pool reported two levels with none. The second is untrue. `Balances`, `Tokens` and `PreFundedSpecializedBalances` are all sum trees directly under the root, and `EstimatedLevel` describes the tree at that path rather than the caller, so one description of one tree cannot be right in two different shapes. The token pool now registers the credit pool's values verbatim, with a comment saying the two must not drift. The three identity-less token pool transitions register both into one estimation map under this one key, so matching values also make that entry independent of the order the operations convert in. Scope, for whoever reads this later: registering `[]` twice with different values is not new and not confined to shielded pools. `insert_contract` v1 calls five `add_estimation_costs_for_token_*` helpers in one pass, four of which claim two levels and no sum trees while the fifth claims three levels with them, and that has shipped since protocol version 13. Across `rs-drive` the root is described seven different ways in twenty-six helpers. This commit does not attempt that cleanup; it fixes the one untrue description this work introduced and leaves the pattern documented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fifteen protocol-version-14 features landed upstream while this branch was being reviewed, and most of them append to the same places this one does. Resolutions, all of the same shape — upstream takes the slot it claimed first and this branch moves down: * `StateError`: upstream's `ReferencedIdentityKeyRequirementNotMetError` keeps 144, the three token pool errors become 145, 146 and 147. * `BasicError`: upstream keeps 194 and 195, `TokenShieldedPoolIncompatibleRules` becomes 196. Both frozen-discriminant tests pin the new numbers. * `v14.rs`: the changelog now runs to thirty-one items, token shielded pools last. Item 24 is upstream's rewritten text; this branch carried the older wording of the same item and it was dropped. * `platform_pb2.py`: regenerated with the pinned `rvolosatovs/protoc:4.0.0` rather than merged by hand. `platform_pb2_grpc.py` came back byte-identical, which is the check that the image matches what produced the committed files. * `wasm-dpp`'s consensus error imports: both sides extended the same two `use` lists, so the lists are merged rather than one side chosen. Neither side's names were lost. One conflict had no textual form. Upstream's new `distinct_from.rs` and `encrypted_for.rs` build a `DocumentBaseTransitionActionV0`, and this branch adds a field to that struct; both files are new to their own side, so git saw nothing while the crate stopped compiling. They now pass `shielded_token_payment: None`. Verified on the merged tree: clippy clean across the workspace with all features and all targets, rustfmt clean, dpp 4778 passing, drive 4079 passing, and all three frozen-discriminant tests green. Consensus error codes carry no duplicates, and the table slots this branch folded into `PLATFORM_V14` survived the merge. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…elded-pools-6642a6
…sighashes The four outputs-only token pool transitions — TokenShield, TokenMintToPool, TokenClaimToPool and TokenDirectPurchaseToPool — bound nothing into their Orchard sighash. Such a bundle also carries no anchor of its own: every token pool starts from the same empty-tree anchor, so its proof and binding signature verify against all of them. That left the authorized bundle bytes a free-standing, self-verifying object. Anyone could lift one out of the mempool into a transition of their own, paid for with their own tokens, against a different pool or a different transition kind, and land a second note with the same commitment and the same rho — hence the same nullifier, of which only one can ever be spent. There is no theft and no inflation in that: the copier pays, and the note is encrypted to the original recipient. The reason to close it is Faerie Gold. A wallet that merges notes by nullifier is safe, but any wallet or indexer that counts by commitment sees two payments where only one is real. Each of the four now binds `bundle tag (1) || token_id (32)`, the layout the identity-less token transitions already use. The tag is needed as well as the token id: a shield and a mint into the same pool agree on everything the proof covers — same flags, same empty-tree anchor, same value_balance — so the token id alone would let either be resubmitted as the other. The kind is named by the existing TokenTransitionActionType rather than by a second enumeration of the same four, and the sighash builder takes that type instead of a loose u8, so no call site can reach for another kind's tag. The byte each kind gets is still written out explicitly: that enum is append-only for the benefit of clients and promises consensus nothing about its ordering. The bytes sit above the state transition type range, which shares the slot and keeps growing, so the two tag spaces cannot collide as new types are added. The three shipped credit shields keep an empty preimage and their bytes are unchanged. The change lives in validate_shielded_proof_v1 and in the new feature's own v0; no shipped generation is touched. Not covered: a copy into the same pool and kind. Catching that needs the bundle's dummy nullifiers to be recorded and checked, which no outputs-only path does yet, here or in the credit pool. That is a separate change, because the credit paths have shipped and would need a new generation. Tests would have caught this in CI: test_token_shield_rejects_a_bundle_proved_for_another_tokens_pool test_token_mint_to_pool_rejects_a_bundle_proved_as_a_shield_of_the_same_token ✖ before the fix — both replays executed successfully — ✔ after. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…d tests Follow-up to the previous commit, which bound a kind tag and the token id into the four outputs-only token pool bundles. The binding itself stands; its justification, one of its arms and the tests around it did not. Three statements in that commit message were wrong, and are corrected here. It called ShieldFromIdentity one of "three shipped credit shields" left on an empty preimage. It is not shipped: SHIELD_FROM_IDENTITY_INITIAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION is 14 and 14 is LATEST_VERSION. Only the credit pool itself shipped, at 12. Binding it is still free and is left to the follow-up that binds owners. It also led with Faerie Gold as the reason, which overstates what the change reaches. Nullifiers are namespaced per pool, so a bundle copied into another pool lands in a different nullifier tree: both notes stay spendable and nothing is Faerie Gold there. The harm of that copy is that one `rho` now yields notes in two pools, linking the recipient's spends across them. Faerie Gold is the same-pool case, and of it the tag reaches only copies into another kind. The larger vector — same pool, same kind, submitted by somebody else — stays open, because the preimage binds no owner. The rustdoc, the four validators and the book now say this instead. It said the typed helper left no call site able to reach for another kind's tag. The type stops a caller passing something that is not a kind; it does nothing about a builder passing a different outputs-only kind, which compiles. Nothing checked that none of them did, so a test now builds a transition with each of the four public builders and verifies its bundle against the preimage that kind's verifier rebuilds, through the same verification consensus runs. It proves and verifies each bundle without executing a block, so covering all four costs one Halo 2 proof apiece. `outputs_only_bundle_tag_v0` had an `other =>` arm. A catch-all on a consensus path turns a kind somebody forgot into a runtime error discovered when a node rejects a block; every kind is now named, so the same omission stops the build instead. Client-facing docs went further out of date than that commit noticed: the WASM sighash helper described unshield as binding only the output address and a withdrawal as binding only the output script. Both have bound the amount since they shipped, and a withdrawal also binds the core fee per byte and the pooling byte. A client following that text produced an invalid sighash. The four token pool layouts are documented there too. On the tests, the previous commit's two replay tests had no positive control: they only ever asserted a rejection, so they passed whenever the bundle was invalid for any reason at all — including a builder and a verifier that simply disagreed. Reverting only the verifier left them green. The new test builds a shield through the public `build_token_shield_transition`, shows CheckTx admitting it and a block executing it, and only then replays that proven bundle into a second pool. Reverting only the verifier now fails it at the positive half. Three CheckTx arms changed in the previous commit and none of them had a test that put a valid bundle through CheckTx. A kind reaching for the wrong tag there would have dropped every honest transition of that kind at admission with the suite still green; the shield, mint and purchase happy paths now assert admission. The tag guard compared 0x80-0x83 against the three transition types that exist today, which cannot fail when a fourth is added inside the range. It now asks the enum. The layout test pinned only 0x80; it pins all four, and the test that rejects every other kind names all fourteen rather than a sample of eight: exhaustiveness catches a kind being added and forgotten, not an existing arm edited into the accepting half. Two claims this commit itself first made were also too broad and are narrowed here. The rustdoc on the tags said the state transition type space could not reach them; `StateTransitionType` is `repr(u8)` and could be given any of those bytes, so what holds the reservation is the guard, not the type system. The book said a bundle proven for one token, owner, recipient or amount could not be replayed with another, which is true of the layouts that spend and not of these four, which bind neither owner nor amount. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four conflicts, and the enum one was not a formatting clash. Git auto-merged `StateError` by placing this branch's three token pool variants ahead of the five v4.2-dev grew in the meantime, which moved those five three positions down the wire. `StateError` is bincode-encoded positionally, so that would have mis-decoded every already-encoded instance of them. Nothing in the enum itself complained; only the frozen-discriminant test conflicted, and that is the only reason it was seen. Resolved the way every earlier rebase of this branch resolved it: the base keeps its positions and the token pool variants go to the tail, 150 to 152 here and 200 in `BasicError`. Two further breakages came out of the same merge and neither was a conflict. `serialization.rs` gained an exhaustive match over `StateTransitionType` on v4.2-dev, written where the token pool transition types do not exist. After the merge they do, so the match no longer covered types 26, 27 and 28 and those three transitions would not have deserialized. The compiler caught it only because that match has no catch-all arm. `DocumentBaseTransitionActionAccessorsV0` gained `agrees_to_a_moderators_discount`, and the merge landed the implementation in the inherent `impl DocumentBaseTransitionAction` block rather than the trait one, where it compiled as an unrelated method while the trait went unimplemented. Verified on the merged tree: the three frozen-discriminant tests pass and `cargo check --workspace --all-features` is clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Eight commits, three conflicts, and the enum one for the third merge running. Git again auto-merged `StateError` by placing this branch's three token pool variants ahead of the one v4.2-dev added, moving `ModerationReasonNotListedError` from 150 to 153. That enum is bincode-encoded positionally, so the shift would have mis-decoded every already-encoded instance of it. As before, only the frozen-discriminant test conflicted; the enum itself merged silently. Resolved the same way: the base keeps its position and the token pool variants move to the tail, 151 to 153. This is why the merge is done in small steps rather than saved for the end. The hazard grows with the number of variants the base adds, and it is invisible except through that one test. `dpp_validation_versions/v5.rs`: v4.2-dev removed `validate_moderation_charter` in #4970, so that removal is taken and only this branch's `validate_token_config_update` remains. `platform_pb2.py` is generated; the base's copy is taken. Verified on the merged tree: the three frozen-discriminant tests pass and `cargo check --workspace --all-features` is clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… shielded payment field Merging v4.2-dev added `shielded_token_payment` to `DocumentBaseTransitionActionV0`, and seven constructors were left without it: six in `batch/tests/document/` and one in the `document_create_transition_action` advanced structure validator. Nothing caught this. Both merges were verified with `cargo check --workspace --all-features`, which builds lib and bin targets and not test ones, so the only constructors that broke were exactly the ones no non-test code touches. It surfaced when a parallel worker tried to build against this branch. `cargo check -p drive-abci --tests` is clean now. The lesson for the next merge here is to use `--all-targets` whenever the claim is that a merge is clean, because a merge that adds a field to a struct breaks precisely the constructors a feature-only check cannot see. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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… behind Resolving the v4.2-dev merges meant moving this branch's error variants to the tail of `BasicError` and `StateError` by hand, so the base kept its wire discriminants. Each move left a blank line before the enum's closing brace, which `cargo fmt --check` rejects. This is what turned the branch's CI red. The verification after that merge ran the frozen-discriminant tests and `cargo check --workspace --all-features`, but not `cargo fmt --check --all`, so nothing local saw it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @book/src/fees/shielded-fees.md:
- Around line 107-114: Update the fee model in the shielded-fees page for
protocol 14: set the proof-verification fee to 40M and describe its roughly
1.8:1 ratio to the 22M per-action processing fee. Revise the storage table to
show the 344-byte physical payload, including cv_net, and calculate fees from
the versioned 550-byte allowance using the existing per-byte rates. Update the
fee table totals to match these values.
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📒 Files selected for processing (23)
book/src/fees/shielded-fees.mdpackages/rs-dpp/src/shielded/compute_minimum_shielded_fee/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/shielded/compute_minimum_shielded_fee/v0/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/shielded/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/state_transition/state_transitions/shielded/shield_from_identity_transition/state_transition_estimated_fee_validation.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/shield/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/shield/tests.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/shield/transform_into_action/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/shield/transform_into_action/v0/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/shield/transform_into_action/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/shield_from_asset_lock/tests.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/shield_from_asset_lock/transform_into_action/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/shield_from_identity/tests.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/shield_from_identity/transform_into_action/v0/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/test_helpers.rspackages/rs-drive/src/state_transition_action/action_convert_to_operations/shielded/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/state_transition_action/action_convert_to_operations/shielded/shield_from_asset_lock_transition.rspackages/rs-drive/src/state_transition_action/action_convert_to_operations/shielded/shield_from_identity_transition.rspackages/rs-drive/src/state_transition_action/action_convert_to_operations/shielded/shield_transition.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_abci_versions/drive_abci_validation_versions/v10.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_versions/drive_state_transition_method_versions/v4.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/v14.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
Verified the findings against head cc34e92 and the supplied PR evidence. The nullifier implementation preserves the PV14 boundary and forwards the active transaction correctly, but two fee defects remain alongside three nonblocking regression and parameter-ownership concerns. This was static verification only; the supplied CI snapshot reports successful Rust workspace and Swift/Kotlin checks, with Dashmate tests and PR Hygiene pending.
🔴 2 blocking | 🟡 3 suggestion(s)
5 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 4: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: platform-versioning); reviewer 6: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 7: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 8: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 9: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 10: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: platform-versioning); reviewer 11: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 12: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — The new shield transform_into_action v1 implementations and shielded action converters intricately change consensus acceptance and persisted nullifier state across three funding paths, alongside paid-failure and fee-admission behavior. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity below 15% reserve: weekly 15% left, 5h 100% left),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— platform-versioning (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— platform-versioning (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer - Model comparison: every Phase-2 reviewer also ran on
gpt-6-astra; the verifier weighed both sets without knowing which model wrote which
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-dpp/src/shielded/mod.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-dpp/src/shielded/mod.rs:182: Raising the identity-balance allowance also raises the token-purchase fee
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/5014#discussion_r4135564849)
This constant also feeds `compute_token_purchase_from_shielded_pool_fee`, which adds it to `SHIELDED_IDENTITY_TOP_UP_BALANCE_STORAGE_BYTES`. Raising it from 20 to 60 therefore increases every token purchase's required fee by 40 × 27,400 = 1,096,000 credits, although this PR changes no token-purchase operations and explicitly limits the recalibration to the identity-shield admission floor. The purchase builder embeds this fee in its credit bundle, and minimum-fee validation requires the pure-fee amount to match exactly, so this changes charged fees and accepted transaction amounts—not just estimation headroom. Both transitions activate at PV14, so this is not a historical replay break. Separate the ShieldFromIdentity allowance from the purchase component and preserve the purchase's existing value, unless its repricing is independently specified and tested.
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-dpp/src/shielded/mod.rs:191-198: Cover the admission estimate in the identity-shield fee floor
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/5014#discussion_r4110507019)
The revised floor covers measured execution, but not the synthetic estimate used for admission. CheckTx calls `validate_fees_of_event`; its identity-paid path estimates operations with `apply_drive_operations(..., false, ...)`, then adds validation costs and the shielded compute fee. The pinned GroveDB estimator prices the nonce and pool-total InsertOrReplace operations as insertions, while the balance layer uses `PotentiallyAtMaxElements` (32 levels). For a two-action bundle, the floor reserves 38,360,000 credits beyond the 84,000,000-credit compute fee. Static accounting already exceeds that reserve: the note, nullifier, nonce and pool-total insertions require at least 1,364 added bytes (37,373,600 credits), and balance-layer propagation alone adds 2,059,200 credits, before other processing and validation costs. Thus an identity funded at exactly `amount + floor` can pass the preliminary floor and still fail authoritative admission. The new test funds one Dash and checks only `charged <= floor`, so it does not resolve this boundary. Calibrate the shared DPP quote against admission as well as execution, or correct the conservative estimator, and add exact-funding regressions across multiple action counts.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-dpp/src/shielded/mod.rs:194-198: Keep admission-floor allowances in the version tables
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/5014#discussion_r4110507021)
The 120-byte per-action allowance and recalibrated 60-byte flat allowance are adjustable admission parameters, not invariant serialized sizes. The version-dispatched formula reads them from global DPP constants, while its base `shielded_storage_bytes_per_action` allowance is selected through PlatformVersion. PV14-only activation makes the present identity-shield edit replay-safe, but later retuning these globals would also change PV14 unless another formula generation or separate constants were introduced. Follow the book's numeric-parameter rule: capture the ShieldFromIdentity allowances in the relevant versioned constants table, read them through `platform_version`, and keep the token-purchase component independent.
In `packages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/shield/tests.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/shield/tests.rs:1599-1604: Also test a repeated shield within one uncommitted block transaction
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/5014#discussion_r4114807002)
Both submissions use `process_transition_and_commit`, which opens and commits a separate transaction each time. This proves rejection against committed nullifiers, but does not protect the new rule's processor-to-storage transaction wiring: the second transform must see the first transition's pending insertions in the same block. Production currently forwards that transaction correctly, and the Drive-level test checks uncommitted membership, but neither protects this end-to-end boundary. Add a companion test submitting the signed shield and its next-nonce repeat together through one `process_raw_state_transitions` call under one uncommitted transaction. Assert success followed by `NullifierAlreadySpentError`, with only the first shield's note and pool effects.
In `packages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/test_helpers.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/test_helpers.rs:550-552: Seed the shared Orchard bundle fixture
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/5014#discussion_r4110507025)
The new shared fixture uses `OsRng` throughout action construction, proof generation and signing. Seeded funding identities and asset locks therefore do not reproduce the bundles: their nullifiers, commitments and proof bytes still change between runs. This makes failures involving the newly recorded keys or their storage ordering harder to reproduce and violates the deterministic consensus-test convention. Use a seeded `StdRng` in this test-only helper, or accept a caller-supplied seeded RNG where distinct fixtures are needed. Keep production randomness unchanged.
Keep the contract-owner balance allowance at 20 bytes independently of ShieldFromIdentity calibration, restoring the token purchase flat allowance to its historical 28 bytes. Make shared outputs-only fixtures reproducible per value, output count and funder binding, and test nullifier replay inside one uncommitted block. Test would have caught this in CI: RED before the fee fix (1,096,000 excess credits), GREEN after for three bundle sizes. Verified 35 nullifier tests and all-feature all-target Clippy on an isolated Cargo target. The separate identity admission-floor regression is still RED and is intentionally outside this commit. Correct the fee guide against PV14 values and arithmetic. Documentation has no behavior delta, so no separate behavior test was added.
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
Verified the supplied findings and all five prior identities against head 9b176c5. The token-purchase fee regression, deterministic fixture, and same-block coverage issues are addressed; the identity-shield admission-floor mismatch remains blocking, with a separate suggestion to version its calibration parameters. This was static verification only: the supplied CI snapshot still had Rust workspace tests, JS builds, and the Swift schema check running.
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 1 suggestion(s)
2 carried-forward finding(s) already raised on this PR; not re-posting as new inline comments.
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: platform-versioning); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 6: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 7: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — The multi-path validation and storage changes are intricate and directly alter consensus acceptance and shielded funds accounting, notably in shield/transform_into_action/v1/mod.rs and shield_from_identity/transform_into_action/v0/mod.rs. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity below 15% reserve: weekly 15% left, 5h 100% left),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— platform-versioning (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-dpp/src/shielded/mod.rs`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/rs-dpp/src/shielded/mod.rs:188-202: Cover the admission estimate in the identity-shield fee floor
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/5014#discussion_r4110507019)
The added allowance is calibrated against metered execution, but identities must first cover the larger dry-run admission estimate. At PV14 rates, this helper returns 40,000,000 + 22,000,000*n + (670*n + 60)*27,400, or 122,360,000 credits for two actions. ShieldFromIdentity becomes an ExecutionEvent::Paid with the shield amount as removed_balance and the verification fee as additional_fixed_fee_cost. For an ordinary unrestricted signing key, validate_fees_of_event_v1 delegates to v0, which calls apply_drive_operations(..., false, ...), adds validation costs and the fixed verification fee, and compares that total against the balance remaining after the shield amount. The newly emitted InsertNullifiers operations participate in this estimate; estimated_costs.rs assigns their tree depth 16 even on a fresh pool. This call chain supports the author's exact-head reproduction: amount 5,000 plus the advertised floor provides 122,365,000 credits, but admission requires 139,654,740—a shortfall of 17,289,740 credits.
The new recording regression cannot establish admission coverage: funded_identity supplies one DASH, and the assertion only compares the eventual charged fee with the floor. The wallet estimator exposes this helper as the complete identity-shield fee, so funding exactly amount plus that estimate can still produce an unpaid refusal. Calibrate the floor against the full admission requirement, or correct the underlying estimate with historical behavior preserved. Add pipeline regressions funded with exactly amount plus the advertised floor across multiple action counts and populated nullifier trees, retaining the metered-charge assertion separately.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-dpp/src/shielded/mod.rs:182-202: Keep admission-floor allowances in the version tables
(existing thread: https://github.com/dashpay/platform/pull/5014#discussion_r4110507021)
The revised 60-byte flat allowance and new 120-byte per-action allowance are tunable admission parameters, but compute_shielded_identity_balance_write_fee_v0 reads them directly from global DPP constants. PlatformVersion selects the storage rate and shielded_storage_bytes_per_action, but cannot independently pin these two calibration values. The PV14 activation gate makes this initial edit safe for earlier protocols; it does not make a later edit to these globals safe for frozen PV14 behavior.
Move these two identity-shield allowances into the relevant versioned event-constant table and read them through platform_version. Preserve historical values in earlier tables and place the PV14 calibration in DRIVE_ABCI_VALIDATION_VERSIONS_V10. This follows the book's 'Numbers live in the version tables' rule and is limited to the admission parameters changed by this PR—not a request to migrate every existing shielded byte constant or alter the restored token-purchase allowance.
Move identity-shield admission allowances into protocol tables: historical versions keep 0/action and 20 flat; PV14 selects 400/action and 500 flat. Calibrate against the complete successful-event estimate, including the most expensive identity signature, rather than only the eventual metered charge. Token purchase retains its independent allowance and fee; charged rates do not change. Update the fee book and PV14 changelog to the final calibration. Test would have caught this in CI: FAIL before fix, PASS after. The complete-event bound failed at all action counts 1..16, and a real Shield funded with exactly amount + wallet estimate failed CheckTx. Both are GREEN; real 2/3/4/6-action bundles pass CheckTx and committed execution on empty and 512-nullifier trees. Tests assert conserved balances, nonces, nullifier writes and actual fee <= wallet floor. Historical wallet estimates remain pinned. Validation: dpp shielded 274; platform-version 25; nullifiers 37; identity Shield 24; all zero ignored. Scoped all-feature/all-target Clippy and workspace all-target check passed. Independent accounting, replay and scope reviews passed. Follow-up corrections for PR #5014.
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
Static verification of the complete PR diff at ee44bba found no remaining actionable in-scope defects. All five prior findings are addressed: nullifier reads use the active transaction, historical behavior remains isolated, token-purchase fees are preserved, and versioned identity-shield admission allowances have targeted regression coverage. No builds or tests were run in this lane; the supplied head-matched CI snapshot still leaves the main Rust/JS pipeline pending.
🔴 0 blocking | 🟡 0 suggestion(s) | 💬 0 nitpick(s)
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: platform-versioning); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 6: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); reviewer 7: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 8: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 9: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 10: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: platform-versioning); reviewer 11: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 12: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — The intricate cross-crate diff changes consensus-critical nullifier rejection and persistence in shield/transform_into_action/v1/mod.rs and shield_transition.rs, alongside identity-shield admission fees and PV14 dispatch. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity below 15% reserve: weekly 15% left, 5h 100% left),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh final gate: an independent Phase-2 review ran after iterative findings were reconciled
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— platform-versioning (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— platform-versioning (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
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No unresolved findings remain from the prior review on this head.
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Basic explanation
What this does: From PV14, Shield, ShieldFromAssetLock and ShieldFromIdentity record every revealed Orchard nullifier and refuse duplicates, including dummy-spend nullifiers in outputs-only bundles.
Value: Reusing a shielding bundle cannot create two notes sharing one rho and one spendable nullifier. An identity holding exactly the shield amount plus the wallet's fee estimate can pass admission.
Risks: Consensus changes at unreleased PV14 only. Identity-shield wallet reserves increase to cover admission estimates; actual fees remain metered. Historical replay and token-purchase fees are preserved. Proof-based tests take longer than structural tests.
Issue being fixed or feature implemented
Outputs-only Orchard actions reveal dummy-spend nullifiers used as the new notes' rho. Previously the shielding paths neither checked nor recorded them, so the same proven bundle could create duplicate notes with only one spendable nullifier. No retrospective nullifier backfill is included. #5181 is a separate follow-up stacked on this PR.
What was done?
In-place changes to shipped generations
How Has This Been Tested?
Actual RED before the fixes: token purchase required an extra 1,096,000 credits; exact-funded two-action identity Shield failed CheckTx; the complete admission estimate exceeded the old floor at every count 1..16. The same regressions became GREEN.
Local checks:
cargo test -p dpp --lib shielded(274 passed),cargo test -p platform-version(25 passed), ABCInullifiers(37 passed) andshield_from_identity(24 passed), all zero ignored. Scoped all-feature/all-target Clippy with-D warnings,cargo check --workspace --all-targetsand formatting passed. Three independent reviews passed.Live-network tests were not run. CI tests and required human approvals remain visible in the checks below.
Breaking Changes
PV14 rejects repeated shielding nullifiers and stores every successful shield's nullifiers. Identity Shield admission reserves are higher. Shipped protocols retain their behavior; no wire-format or tree-layout change.
Checklist:
structure.rs, regeneratedgrovedb-structure.json, and checked the structure viewer link posted on this pull requestFor repository code-owners and collaborators only
PR Hygiene ·
ee44bbadpp— you own itrs-drive-abci— you own itrs-drive— you own itrs-platform-wallet-ffi(packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs) — HashEngineering or ZocoLini or llbartekll or romchornyiWhen every box is checked the
PR Hygienecheck passes and this can merge.Summary by CodeRabbit