fix(clerk-js): discard a stored session token that was never a mint

packages/clerk-js/src/core/__tests__/protectSession.test.ts

@@ -383,6 +383,39 @@ describe('ProtectSession inline token', () => {
     await expect(created?.getRequestParams()).resolves.toMatchObject({ __clerk_protect_token: 'v1.payload.mac' });
   });
 
+  it('ignores a planted value that could never have been a mint', async () => {
+    localStorage.setItem(
+      '__clerk_protect_st',
+      JSON.stringify({ token: 'not-a-token', exp: nowSeconds() + 43_200, rid: 'b'.repeat(26) }),
+    );
+
+    const { session: created, injected } = session([loader()]);
+    // Shape alone proves nothing — only the server can tell a mint from a well-formed forgery —
+    // but a corrupt entry must start a fresh run rather than suppress acquisition until it expires.
+    expect(created?.hasFreshToken()).toBe(false);
+
+    created?.start();
+    serveInline(await injected(), { cid: created?.placeholders().cid });
+
+    await expect(created?.getRequestParams()).resolves.toMatchObject({ __clerk_protect_token: 'v1.payload.mac' });
+  });
+
+  it('reuses a mint whose version this build predates', async () => {
+    localStorage.setItem(
+      '__clerk_protect_st',
+      JSON.stringify({ token: 'v9.cached.mac', exp: nowSeconds() + 43_200, rid: 'b'.repeat(26) }),
+    );
+
+    // The shape check must not pin a version. The server may mint ahead of this build, and
+    // rejecting that here would re-run the loader on every page load until the SDK caught up.
+    const { session: created, elements } = session([loader()]);
+    expect(created?.hasFreshToken()).toBe(true);
+    created?.start();
+
+    await expect(created?.getRequestParams()).resolves.toMatchObject({ __clerk_protect_token: 'v9.cached.mac' });
+    expect(elements).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
   it('reports nothing at all for a loader that carries no correlation id', async () => {
     const { session: created, elements } = session([loader({ attributes: { 'data-pid': '{pid}' } })]);
 

packages/clerk-js/src/core/protectSession.ts

@@ -38,6 +38,11 @@ const MAX_TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS = 10 * 1_000;
 const MAX_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1_000;
 /** Longest token we will hand back, so a planted store entry cannot bloat a sign-in body. */
 const MAX_TOKEN_LENGTH = 4_096;
+/**
+ * The shape of a mint: `v<n>.<payload>.<mac>`, base64url. Version-agnostic on purpose — the server
+ * may mint a version this build predates, and only the server can judge a token either way.
+ */
+const TOKEN_SHAPE = /^v\d+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;
 /** How long a settled, tokenless acquisition is reused before a fresh run is allowed. */
 const REACQUIRE_COOLDOWN_MS = 30 * 1_000;
 /** Bounds we hold the server-supplied `retry_in_ms` to. */
@@ -245,9 +250,14 @@ function readStoredToken(key: string, marginMs: number): StoredToken | null {
 /**
  * The store is writable by anything running on the origin, so a value that could not have come
  * from a mint of ours is discarded rather than trusted to suppress the loaders.
+ *
+ * The shape check is hygiene, not a security boundary: only the server can tell a real token from a
+ * well-formed forgery, and anything that can write the store can send the same values to the API
+ * directly. What it buys is that a corrupt or truncated entry starts a fresh run immediately
+ * instead of suppressing acquisition until it expires.
  */
 function validateToken(token: unknown, exp: unknown, marginMs: number): { token: string; exp: number } | null {
-  if (typeof token !== 'string' || !token || token.length > MAX_TOKEN_LENGTH) {
+  if (typeof token !== 'string' || token.length > MAX_TOKEN_LENGTH || !TOKEN_SHAPE.test(token)) {
     return null;
   }
   if (typeof exp !== 'number' || !Number.isFinite(exp)) {