build(deps): update agent-manifest requirement from >=0.11.0 to >=0.11.2

[dependabot]

Updates the requirements on agent-manifest to permit the latest version.

Release notes

Sourced from agent-manifest's releases.

python-v0.11.2

What's Changed

• spec: pin the composite policy-bundle Merkle leaf encoding (3.2.2) by @​imran-siddique in agentrust-io/agent-manifest#335
• spec: announce 2026-11-30 as the v0.1 manifest issuance end date by @​imran-siddique in agentrust-io/agent-manifest#336
• docs: track MCP 2026 manifest compatibility by @​imran-siddique in agentrust-io/agent-manifest#341
• spec(4.1.1): let "all Merkle tree constructions" mean all by @​imran-siddique in agentrust-io/agent-manifest#342
• docs: map Agent Manifest standards integrations by @​imran-siddique in agentrust-io/agent-manifest#346
• docs: make the standards landscape visible and hands-on by @​imran-siddique in agentrust-io/agent-manifest#347
• Make-standards-map-readable by @​imran-siddique in agentrust-io/agent-manifest#349
• fix(verify): cross-check enforcement_mode when verifying policy_bundle by @​rajnisht7 in agentrust-io/agent-manifest#345
• chore(release): prepare Python v0.11.2 by @​imran-siddique in agentrust-io/agent-manifest#350

New Contributors

• @​rajnisht7 made their first contribution in agentrust-io/agent-manifest#345

Full Changelog: agentrust-io/agent-manifest@python-v0.11.1...python-v0.11.2

Changelog

Sourced from agent-manifest's changelog.

[0.11.2] — 2026-08-27

Fixed

• [SECURITY][SDK] verify_manifest now binds a declared artifacts.policy_bundle.enforcement_mode to the runtime's attested mode. A mismatch or an omitted runtime mode fails closed instead of accepting a matching policy hash while the runtime operates with weaker enforcement.

[0.11.1] — 2026-08-23

Fixed

• [SECURITY][SDK] The integrated verification path now authenticates every enforced HITL approval against a trusted approver key and binds that approval to the manifest being verified. Missing keys, malformed or invalid approval signatures, and approvals replayed from another manifest fail closed. See GHSA-ww2p-prj4-c6xf.

• [SECURITY][CLI] manifest verify gained --approver-key APPROVER_ID=PATH (repeatable) to supply trusted HITL approver keys. Without it the CLI had no input that could populate approver_public_keys, so every approval resolved to UNVERIFIABLE and --enforce-hitl could not succeed. A failing result now names the missing option.

• [SECURITY][SDK] Bound runtime artifacts now fail closed when their observed hashes are absent. Signature-only appraisal remains available only through an explicit API or CLI opt-out and must not be used as authorization evidence about a deployed agent.

• [SECURITY][SDK] Transparency receipts are no longer treated as a warning- only attachment at production conformance levels. Level 1+ (or explicit require_transparency) requires an entry ID or receipt digest produced by an independent appraisal against the relying party's trusted transparency-log policy. An attacker-controlled receipt in a COSE unprotected header is UNVERIFIABLE, not proof of inclusion.

Added

• [SPEC][SDK] Added configuration assurance for artifact #1 (spec 3.2.1.1, issue #254). Every threat in section 7.1 is an adversary substituting something, and system_prompt.hash detects that. A prompt authored in good faith, reviewed, approved, signed, sealed to a TEE measurement and verified VALID may still specify behaviour the deploying organisation would reject if it were tested rather than read, with no adversary present and no digest changed. Artifact #1 is the specification of the agent's behaviour rather than data it consumes, so digest equality is necessary and not sufficient.

  system_prompt.assurance_test binds a named suite, suite version, harness version and result, the same shape and the same normative force section 3.2.5

... (truncated)

Commits

• 9d26ac8 chore(release): prepare Python v0.11.2 (#350)
• b8160e3 initial commit (#345)
• 8fd498b Make-standards-map-readable (#349)
• 605946b docs:improve-integration-guide (#347)
• 782f4ed docs:standards-integration (#346)
• ebe0528 spec(4.1.1): let "all Merkle tree constructions" mean all (#342)
• 02632d5 docs: track MCP 2026 manifest compatibility (#341)
• 3bb3ee5 spec: announce 2026-11-30 as the v0.1 manifest issuance end date (#336)
• d7de810 spec: pin the composite policy-bundle Merkle leaf encoding (3.2.2) (#335)
• f320b42 release: prepare agent-manifest 0.11.1 (#334)
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