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π‘οΈ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Mitigate zip bomb DoS in mod archive inspection - #326
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Cap decompressed reads of info.json to 2 MiB across mod_store and downloader to prevent out-of-memory denial of service.
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π¨ Severity: MEDIUM
π‘ Vulnerability: Unbounded decompression stream when reading
info.jsonfrom untrusted mod archives (entry.read_to_string(&mut s)) inmod_store::read_info_jsonanddownloader::verify_mod_zip_sync.π― Impact: A malicious zip bomb or heavily padded entry could exhaust system memory during library scan or download verification, causing application crash (Denial of Service).
π§ Fix: Wrapped the decompressed entry reader with
.take(MAX_INFO_JSON_BYTES)(2 MiB limit) before reading into a string, added unit tests verifying that oversized archives are capped and rejected cleanly, and documented security learnings in.jules/sentinel.md.β Verification: Ran
cargo test --manifest-path src-tauri/Cargo.toml(all 142 tests passing) andpnpm build.PR created automatically by Jules for task 4827880971884044475 started by @TheDragonSoft