[google-labs-jules]

🚨 Severity: MEDIUM
💡 Vulnerability: Untrusted mod zips scanned or downloaded into the application had their info.json entries decompressed into memory using Read::read_to_string without an upper bound on decompressed byte length. A malicious or malformed archive entry (zip bomb) could expand indefinitely, exhausting system memory and causing an Out-Of-Memory (OOM) denial-of-service crash.
🎯 Impact: Denial of Service (application crash / system memory exhaustion) upon downloading or scanning a crafted mod zip bomb.
🔧 Fix: Added read_entry_to_string_capped helper in mod_store.rs that caps stream reads at 1 MiB (MAX_INFO_JSON_BYTES + 1) via .take(), rejecting oversized entries cleanly with an error. Applied this to both mod_store::read_info_json and downloader::verify_mod_zip_sync.
✅ Verification: Added unit tests verifying rejection of entries exceeding 1 MiB in both mod_store and downloader, verified all 143 backend tests pass (cargo test --manifest-path src-tauri/Cargo.toml), and confirmed pnpm build succeeds.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 17173700962531420412 started by @TheDragonSoft

[google-labs-jules]

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