Apilot reads HTTP responses and stores them in your repository, so it has two jobs that can go wrong quietly: keeping secrets out of files, and not silently corrupting the record of what your API returned.

Please do not open a public issue. Use GitHub's private reporting on this repository:

Report a vulnerability

That opens a private advisory visible only to you and the maintainer. If you cannot use it, open an issue that says only "I have a security report" and wait to be contacted.

Useful reports, in rough order of severity:

• A secret value (token, password, key, cookie) reaching a file that is committed, a snapshot, a log, or an MCP tool result.
• The bridge in .apilot/.local/bridge.json accepting calls without the token, leaking the token, or being reachable beyond 127.0.0.1.
• A way to make the MCP server or a generated file write outside the project directory.
• Code execution through an imported spec, a cURL command, or a crafted apilot.yaml.

This is a single-maintainer project. You will get an acknowledgement as soon as possible, but no contractual response time. Please give a reasonable window before disclosing.

Secret values are never written to .apilot/: the editor keeps them in the OS keychain and CI reads APILOT_SECRET_<name>. Responses are redacted before they are saved.

But redaction only knows about values you declared. If an endpoint returns a secret that is not modelled as a variable — a session token in a response body, a personal identifier — it can land in .apilot/snapshots/ and be committed. Treat snapshots as data you publish: review them before committing, and keep secrets out of response bodies where the API allows.

Snapshots are written by design. That is the feature, and also the risk.

The latest published release. This project is pre-1.0: fixes ship in the next release rather than as backports to older ones.