diff --git a/sql/test_factory--0.5.0.sql b/sql/test_factory--0.5.0.sql
index 340e33f..75c4f90 100644
--- a/sql/test_factory--0.5.0.sql
+++ b/sql/test_factory--0.5.0.sql
@@ -15,6 +15,23 @@ EXCEPTION
 END
 $body$;
 
+/*
+ * As of PG16, CREATE ROLE no longer grants the creating role a SET-enabled
+ * membership in the new role, so SET ROLE test_factory__owner below fails
+ * unless the current role is a superuser (which bypasses the check). Grant it
+ * explicitly WITH SET so a non-superuser install works too. Runs
+ * unconditionally, even when the role already existed and CREATE ROLE was a
+ * no-op. Gated on PG16+, where the WITH SET syntax exists; pre-16 GRANT ... TO
+ * already confers the ability to SET ROLE.
+ */
+DO $body$
+BEGIN
+	IF current_setting('server_version_num')::int >= 160000 THEN
+		EXECUTE format('GRANT test_factory__owner TO %I WITH SET TRUE', current_user);
+	END IF;
+END
+$body$;
+
 CREATE SCHEMA tf AUTHORIZATION test_factory__owner;
 COMMENT ON SCHEMA tf IS $$Test factory. Tools for maintaining test data.$$;
 GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA tf TO public;
diff --git a/sql/test_factory.sql b/sql/test_factory.sql
index c44b076..baf8a5f 100644
--- a/sql/test_factory.sql
+++ b/sql/test_factory.sql
@@ -14,6 +14,23 @@ EXCEPTION
 END
 $body$;
 
+/*
+ * As of PG16, CREATE ROLE no longer grants the creating role a SET-enabled
+ * membership in the new role, so SET ROLE test_factory__owner below fails
+ * unless the current role is a superuser (which bypasses the check). Grant it
+ * explicitly WITH SET so a non-superuser install works too. Runs
+ * unconditionally, even when the role already existed and CREATE ROLE was a
+ * no-op. Gated on PG16+, where the WITH SET syntax exists; pre-16 GRANT ... TO
+ * already confers the ability to SET ROLE.
+ */
+DO $body$
+BEGIN
+	IF current_setting('server_version_num')::int >= 160000 THEN
+		EXECUTE format('GRANT test_factory__owner TO %I WITH SET TRUE', current_user);
+	END IF;
+END
+$body$;
+
 CREATE SCHEMA tf AUTHORIZATION test_factory__owner;
 COMMENT ON SCHEMA tf IS $$Test factory. Tools for maintaining test data.$$;
 GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA tf TO public;
diff --git a/test/expected/base.out b/test/expected/base.out
index 57f115a..de59c65 100644
--- a/test/expected/base.out
+++ b/test/expected/base.out
@@ -1,24 +1,25 @@
 \set ECHO none
 Creating extension test_factory
-ok 1 - Register test customers
-ok 2 - Create function customer__add
-ok 3 - Register test invoices
-ok 4 - Ensure original_role temp table was dropped
-ok 5 - Ensure role is put back after install
-ok 6 - Security definer function _tf.schema__getsert has search_path=pg_catalog
-ok 7 - Security definer function _tf.test_factory__get has search_path=pg_catalog
-ok 8 - Security definer function _tf.test_factory__set has search_path=pg_catalog
-ok 9 - Security definer function _tf.table_create has search_path=pg_catalog
-ok 10 - Security definer function _tf.get has search_path=pg_catalog
-ok 11 - customer table is empty
-ok 12 - invoice table is empty
-ok 13 - invoice factory output
-ok 14 - invoice table content
-ok 15 - customer table content
-ok 16 - invoice factory second call
-ok 17 - invoice table content stayed constant
-ok 18 - customer table content stayed constant
-ok 19 - Test function factory
-ok 20 - customer table has new row
-ok 21 - truncate invoice
-ok 22 - invoice factory get remains the same after truncate
+ok 1 - Installing role has SET-enabled membership in test_factory__owner (issue #14)
+ok 2 - Register test customers
+ok 3 - Create function customer__add
+ok 4 - Register test invoices
+ok 5 - Ensure original_role temp table was dropped
+ok 6 - Ensure role is put back after install
+ok 7 - Security definer function _tf.schema__getsert has search_path=pg_catalog
+ok 8 - Security definer function _tf.test_factory__get has search_path=pg_catalog
+ok 9 - Security definer function _tf.test_factory__set has search_path=pg_catalog
+ok 10 - Security definer function _tf.table_create has search_path=pg_catalog
+ok 11 - Security definer function _tf.get has search_path=pg_catalog
+ok 12 - customer table is empty
+ok 13 - invoice table is empty
+ok 14 - invoice factory output
+ok 15 - invoice table content
+ok 16 - customer table content
+ok 17 - invoice factory second call
+ok 18 - invoice table content stayed constant
+ok 19 - customer table content stayed constant
+ok 20 - Test function factory
+ok 21 - customer table has new row
+ok 22 - truncate invoice
+ok 23 - invoice factory get remains the same after truncate
diff --git a/test/expected/install.out b/test/expected/install.out
index ae61611..9c7abeb 100644
--- a/test/expected/install.out
+++ b/test/expected/install.out
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ ok 1 - drop extension test_factory_pgtap
 ok 2 - drop extension test_factory
 ok 3 - Extension test_factory should not exist
 ok 4 - Extension test_factory_pgtap should not exist
-ok 5 - create extension
+ok 5 - create extension as a non-superuser role (issue #14)
 ok 6 - Function tf.tap(text, text) should exist
 ok 7 - clean-up test_factory_pgtap
 ok 8 - clean-up test_factory
diff --git a/test/expected/security.out b/test/expected/security.out
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7313ce6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/expected/security.out
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+\set ECHO none
+Creating extension test_factory
+ok 1 - Bare, unprivileged role can register test data with zero extra grants
+ok 2 - Bare, unprivileged role can create+fetch test data with zero extra grants
+ok 3 - Bare, unprivileged role gets the cached row on a second call
+ok 4 - Bare role cannot SET ROLE into the extension owner role
diff --git a/test/helpers/create.sql b/test/helpers/create.sql
index 9897f75..eae4f54 100644
--- a/test/helpers/create.sql
+++ b/test/helpers/create.sql
@@ -7,7 +7,15 @@ GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA tap TO test_role;
  */
 
 CREATE SCHEMA test AUTHORIZATION test_role;
-SET ROLE = test_role;
+/*
+ * SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION (not SET ROLE): it changes session_user too, not
+ * just current_user. Permission checks for a *further* SET ROLE (like the one
+ * test_factory's install does, and like issue #14's bug) are based on
+ * session_user's superuser status, not current_user's -- so a plain SET ROLE
+ * here would leave that one class of check silently bypassed for the rest of
+ * this file, since pg_regress always connects as a superuser.
+ */
+SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION test_role;
 SET search_path = test, tap;
 
 CREATE TABLE customer(
diff --git a/test/sql/base.sql b/test/sql/base.sql
index f52bf4a..700342c 100644
--- a/test/sql/base.sql
+++ b/test/sql/base.sql
@@ -4,6 +4,36 @@
 \set extension_name test_factory
 \i test/helpers/create_extension.sql
 
+/*
+ * Regression test for issue #14. On PostgreSQL 16+, CREATE ROLE no longer
+ * grants the creating role a SET-enabled membership in the new role, so the
+ * install must GRANT test_factory__owner ... WITH SET TRUE or the SET ROLE
+ * performed during install fails for non-superuser installs (RDS/Aurora). A
+ * real superuser bypasses the SET ROLE check, so a plain install here cannot
+ * reproduce the failure; instead assert the SET-enabled membership the fix
+ * establishes. pg_auth_members.set_option only exists on PG16+, so the check is
+ * skipped (with identical TAP output) on older versions, where a plain
+ * GRANT ... TO already confers the ability to SET ROLE.
+ */
+SELECT (current_setting('server_version_num')::int >= 160000) AS pg16plus \gset
+\if :pg16plus
+SELECT ok(
+  EXISTS(
+    SELECT 1
+      FROM pg_auth_members
+      WHERE roleid = 'test_factory__owner'::regrole
+        AND member = current_user::regrole
+        AND set_option
+  )
+  , 'Installing role has SET-enabled membership in test_factory__owner (issue #14)'
+);
+\else
+SELECT ok(
+  true
+  , 'Installing role has SET-enabled membership in test_factory__owner (issue #14)'
+);
+\endif
+
 -- NOTE: This runs some tests itself
 \i test/helpers/create.sql
 
diff --git a/test/sql/install.sql b/test/sql/install.sql
index ae58bf3..57aa986 100644
--- a/test/sql/install.sql
+++ b/test/sql/install.sql
@@ -9,11 +9,41 @@ SET client_min_messages = WARNING;
  */
 SELECT lives_ok($$DROP EXTENSION IF EXISTS test_factory_pgtap$$, 'drop extension test_factory_pgtap');
 SELECT lives_ok($$DROP EXTENSION IF EXISTS test_factory$$, 'drop extension test_factory');
+/*
+ * test_factory__owner is deliberately left behind by DROP EXTENSION (the
+ * install script tolerates it already existing, so a real install/uninstall
+ * cycle by the same installer keeps working). But this test creates a fresh,
+ * disposable test_factory_installer role below, and an orphaned owner role
+ * from a previous run of *this file* would belong to an installer that no
+ * longer exists -- drop it defensively so repeated local `make installcheck`
+ * runs against the same cluster don't flake.
+ */
+DROP ROLE IF EXISTS test_factory__owner;
 
 SELECT hasnt_extension( 'test_factory' );
 SELECT hasnt_extension( 'test_factory_pgtap' );
 
-SELECT lives_ok($$CREATE EXTENSION test_factory_pgtap CASCADE$$, 'create extension');
+/*
+ * Install as a genuine non-superuser role (NOSUPERUSER + CREATEROLE mirrors
+ * what a real RDS/Aurora master user has), now that both control files are
+ * marked `superuser = false`. Before the issue #14 fix this fails with
+ * "must be able to SET ROLE test_factory__owner"; after the fix it succeeds.
+ */
+CREATE ROLE test_factory_installer NOSUPERUSER CREATEROLE;
+-- USAGE on tap is a pgtap test-harness necessity (to call lives_ok() etc.
+-- below), not one of the grants under test here.
+GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA tap TO test_factory_installer;
+-- CREATE ON DATABASE is never granted to PUBLIC by default (only CONNECT/TEMP
+-- are) -- a real RDS/Aurora master user gets this explicitly via rds_superuser,
+-- so grant it here to mirror that setup.
+DO $body$
+BEGIN
+  EXECUTE format('GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE %I TO test_factory_installer', current_database());
+END
+$body$;
+SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION test_factory_installer;
+SELECT lives_ok($$CREATE EXTENSION test_factory_pgtap CASCADE$$, 'create extension as a non-superuser role (issue #14)');
+RESET SESSION AUTHORIZATION;
 COMMIT;
 
 SELECT has_function('tf', 'tap', array['text','text']);
@@ -21,6 +51,12 @@ SELECT has_function('tf', 'tap', array['text','text']);
 -- Cleanup
 SELECT lives_ok($$DROP EXTENSION IF EXISTS test_factory_pgtap$$, 'clean-up test_factory_pgtap');
 SELECT lives_ok($$DROP EXTENSION IF EXISTS test_factory$$, 'clean-up test_factory');
+-- DROP ROLE alone fails while the GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA tap above still holds;
+-- DROP OWNED clears any privileges/ownership left in this database first.
+DROP OWNED BY test_factory_installer;
+DROP ROLE IF EXISTS test_factory_installer;
+-- See the comment above the earlier DROP ROLE IF EXISTS test_factory__owner.
+DROP ROLE IF EXISTS test_factory__owner;
 
 /*
  * Arguably we should cleanup pgtap and the tap schema...
diff --git a/test/sql/security.sql b/test/sql/security.sql
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ba5047
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/sql/security.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+\set ECHO none
+\i test/helpers/setup.sql
+
+\set extension_name test_factory
+\i test/helpers/create_extension.sql
+
+/*
+ * Prove the public tf.* API needs nothing beyond what a freshly-created,
+ * unprivileged login role already gets by default: no owned schema, no
+ * explicit GRANTs, and (deliberately) no membership in test_factory__owner.
+ * Everything it uses here (tf/_tf schema USAGE, EXECUTE on tf.* functions,
+ * CREATE TEMP TABLE) comes from either Postgres' own defaults or the GRANTs
+ * test_factory's install script makes to PUBLIC.
+ */
+SET ROLE = DEFAULT;
+CREATE ROLE test_factory_bare_user;
+-- USAGE on tap is a pgtap test-harness necessity (to call lives_ok() etc.
+-- below), not one of the grants under test here.
+GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA tap TO test_factory_bare_user;
+/*
+ * SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION, not SET ROLE: it changes session_user too, which
+ * is what a further SET ROLE's permission check actually looks at. A plain
+ * SET ROLE here would leave this session able to SET ROLE into anything
+ * (including test_factory__owner below) regardless of grants, since
+ * pg_regress always connects as a superuser.
+ */
+SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION test_factory_bare_user;
+
+CREATE TEMP TABLE widget(
+  widget_id   serial  PRIMARY KEY
+  , name      text    NOT NULL
+);
+
+SELECT lives_ok(
+$lives_ok$SELECT tf.register(
+  'widget'
+  , array[
+    row(
+      'base'
+      , $$INSERT INTO widget VALUES (DEFAULT, 'gadget') RETURNING *$$
+    )::tf.test_set
+  ]
+);$lives_ok$
+  , 'Bare, unprivileged role can register test data with zero extra grants'
+);
+
+SELECT results_eq(
+  $$SELECT * FROM tf.get( NULL::widget, 'base' )$$
+  , $$VALUES( 1, 'gadget' )$$
+  , 'Bare, unprivileged role can create+fetch test data with zero extra grants'
+);
+
+SELECT results_eq(
+  $$SELECT * FROM tf.get( NULL::widget, 'base' )$$
+  , $$VALUES( 1, 'gadget' )$$
+  , 'Bare, unprivileged role gets the cached row on a second call'
+);
+
+-- Confirm role isolation still holds for a role that otherwise works fine
+SELECT throws_ok(
+  $$SET ROLE test_factory__owner$$
+  , '42501'
+  , NULL
+  , 'Bare role cannot SET ROLE into the extension owner role'
+);
+
+ROLLBACK;
+
+-- vi: expandtab ts=2 sw=2
diff --git a/test_factory.control b/test_factory.control
index a18e438..8faf2d4 100644
--- a/test_factory.control
+++ b/test_factory.control
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
 comment = 'A framework for managing test data'
 default_version = '0.5.0'
 relocatable = false
+# Not a security boundary weakening: test_factory__owner is a locked-down,
+# dedicated owner role and every privileged function is SECURITY DEFINER with
+# search_path=pg_catalog specifically so this is safe to install without a
+# real superuser (e.g. RDS/Aurora's non-superuser master user). Installing
+# still requires CREATEROLE (for test_factory__owner) plus CREATE on the
+# target database.
+superuser = false
diff --git a/test_factory_pgtap.control b/test_factory_pgtap.control
index 8e4a75f..0711698 100644
--- a/test_factory_pgtap.control
+++ b/test_factory_pgtap.control
@@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ comment = 'A framework for managing test data'
 default_version = '0.1.0'
 relocatable = false
 requires = 'pgtap, test_factory'
+# See test_factory.control -- same rationale.
+superuser = false