From b8600500b0613e50625ff51fe4af4807ebe9e56d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joep Meindertsma Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 17:38:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite the China and cost objections on the Dutch Pause Button page - China: current state of Chinese DUV and EUV (SSA800, Shenzhen prototype, AI Futures forecast) and the fact that China's advanced chips still run on ASML-serviced machines - Cost: it is a condition, not an export stop; compare with the MATCH Act; Operation Beethoven as precedent for compensation - Drop the Worstall reference --- src/posts/asml-pause-button.md | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/posts/asml-pause-button.md b/src/posts/asml-pause-button.md index 0c470790..7a81ed67 100644 --- a/src/posts/asml-pause-button.md +++ b/src/posts/asml-pause-button.md @@ -169,8 +169,13 @@ The EU's [Anti-Coercion Instrument](https://iep.unibocconi.eu/why-asml-eus-most- And as Hurst argues, even under retaliation Europe does not fall further behind, because the whole race slows down. **China will catch up, so the lever will become worthless.** -That is an argument for speed, not for waiting. -EUV remains the only path to the newest nodes for years to come, and SMIC's multi-patterning has low yields. +Not soon. +China's first domestically built immersion DUV tool, delivered in 2026 at about [five units a year](https://asiatimes.com/2026/07/chinas-duv-lithography-still-lags-asml-by-four-generations/), matches an ASML machine from 2008, still imports 70% of its components, and has not yet run in a commercial fab. +The Shenzhen EUV prototype that Reuters revealed in December 2025 [produces light but no chips](https://www.engadget.com/big-tech/china-reportedly-has-a-prototype-euv-machine-built-by-ex-asml-employees-235833756.html), with 2030 as the insiders' own target. +A [June 2026 forecast](https://blog.aifutures.org/p/a-forecast-of-chinese-duv-and-euv) puts commercial-scale Chinese DUV for 7nm in the mid-2030s and EUV for 5nm in the late 2030s. +Until then, China's advanced chips come off [several hundred ASML DUV machines](https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-lithography-loophole-how-china-is-printing-its-way-to-chip-self-sufficiency/) that ASML services roughly every six months, with 5nm yields [as low as 20%](https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-lithography-loophole-how-china-is-printing-its-way-to-chip-self-sufficiency/) and costs 40 to 50% above TSMC's. +So the lever reaches China too, for years rather than months, though AI itself could shorten that. +That is a window, not a permanent condition, which is the argument for using it now. **A unilateral Dutch pause does not work.** Correct, for a blunt export stop. @@ -180,14 +185,14 @@ What slows down is the exponential growth. The Netherlands supplies the enforcement module, not the whole solution. **It will cost ASML billions and the Netherlands jobs.** -ASML has [44,000 employees in the Netherlands](https://www.talosnetwork.org/perspectives/boosting-the-eus-position-in-ai-through-third-places-diplomacy-9ym5d) and €16 billion in supplier spending. -Non-AI demand stays. -The [AI Policy Bulletin](https://www.aipolicybulletin.org/articles/bargaining-chips-could-the-eu-leverage-asml-to-influence-u-s-ai-policy) and Talos Network both propose a compensation fund, which belongs in this proposal. -For comparison: the MATCH Act would hit [about a fifth](https://www.dutchnews.nl/2026/06/netherlands-joins-us-chip-pact-while-fighting-asml-export-curbs/) of ASML's expected 2026 revenue, and the Dutch government treats that as unavoidable. +That assumes an export stop, which is not what we're proposing. +With our proposal, the cost falls on whoever refuses it: a fab that registers its output and admits inspectors keeps buying machines. +ASML already cannot meet demand, so a cap on AI-bound tools shifts orders rather than cancelling them, and service revenue from installed machines continues. +The comparison is not with zero but with the MATCH Act, which would hit [about a fifth](https://www.dutchnews.nl/2026/06/netherlands-joins-us-chip-pact-while-fighting-asml-export-curbs/) of ASML's expected 2026 revenue and which the Dutch government already treats as unavoidable. +Where there is real cost, a compensation fund belongs in the proposal; the Netherlands put [€2.5 billion](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240328-operation-beethoven-dutch-2-5bn-euro-charm-offensive-to-keep-asml) into the Eindhoven region in 2024 to keep ASML, so the precedent exists. **Export controls always fail.** -[Tim Worstall](https://www.timworstall.com/2026/09/weird-weird-ideas/) made this argument in response to the Guardian piece. -But the EUV ban on China has held since 2019, and the [Institute for AI Policy and Strategy](https://www.iaps.ai/research/semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment-export-controls) calls it largely effective. +The EUV ban on China has held since 2019, and the [Institute for AI Policy and Strategy](https://www.iaps.ai/research/semiconductor-manufacturing-equipment-export-controls) calls it largely effective. What fails are controls without a maintenance ban and without allies. Both are in this proposal.