diff --git a/backend/apps/model_managment_app.py b/backend/apps/model_managment_app.py
index 4c478781d..71855d72c 100644
--- a/backend/apps/model_managment_app.py
+++ b/backend/apps/model_managment_app.py
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@
 Authorization: Mutating endpoints require RBAC permissions (model:create /
 model:update / model:delete) via ``permissions.depends.require``; read endpoints
 require ``model:read``. Cross-tenant ``/manage/*`` endpoints additionally
-require the SU role. Identity is resolved from the bearer token into a
+require the SU role, or the ADMIN role when the targeted tenant is the
+caller's own. Identity is resolved from the bearer token into a
 ``CurrentUser`` and propagated as ``user_id`` / ``tenant_id`` to services.
 """
 
@@ -77,9 +78,11 @@
 MODEL_READ_PERMISSION = "model:read"
 MODEL_UPDATE_PERMISSION = "model:update"
 MODEL_DELETE_PERMISSION = "model:delete"
-# Cross-tenant manage endpoints are SU-only; ADMIN shares the same MODEL seeds
-# so permission strings cannot separate them.
-_MANAGE_ALLOWED_ROLES = ("SU",)
+# Roles allowed on the cross-tenant /manage/* endpoints. ADMIN shares the same
+# MODEL permission seeds as SU, so permission strings cannot separate the two
+# and the role itself must be checked. ADMIN is scoped to its own tenant by
+# ``_require_manage_scope``; SU may target any tenant.
+_MANAGE_ALLOWED_ROLES = ("SU", "ADMIN")
 
 # Model Catalog loader (with graceful fallback)
 try:
@@ -147,12 +150,25 @@ def _log_safe(value: Any) -> str:
     return _LOG_UNSAFE_CHARS.sub("", str(value))
 
 
-def _require_manage_role(current_user: CurrentUser) -> None:
-    """Restrict cross-tenant manage endpoints to super admins."""
-    if current_user.normalized_role not in _MANAGE_ALLOWED_ROLES:
+def _require_manage_scope(current_user: CurrentUser, target_tenant_id: str) -> None:
+    """Authorize a /manage/* call against the tenant it targets.
+
+    SU may manage any tenant. ADMIN may manage only the tenant its token
+    belongs to -- the tenant-resource page always passes the caller's own
+    tenant_id, so restricting ADMIN outright would break tenant admins
+    managing their own models while blocking no cross-tenant access. Any
+    other role, or an ADMIN naming a foreign tenant, is rejected.
+    """
+    role = current_user.normalized_role
+    if role not in _MANAGE_ALLOWED_ROLES:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN,
+            detail="This operation requires SU or tenant ADMIN role",
+        )
+    if role != "SU" and target_tenant_id != current_user.tenant_id:
         raise HTTPException(
             status_code=HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN,
-            detail="This operation requires SU role",
+            detail="Tenant admins may only manage models of their own tenant",
         )
 
 
@@ -716,7 +732,7 @@ async def manage_check_model_health(
     Returns:
         Connectivity check result with updated status.
     """
-    _require_manage_role(current_user)
+    _require_manage_scope(current_user, request.tenant_id)
     try:
         logger.debug(
             f"Start to check model connectivity for tenant, user_id: {current_user.user_id}, "
@@ -760,7 +776,7 @@ async def manage_create_model(
     Returns:
         Success message on successful creation.
     """
-    _require_manage_role(current_user)
+    _require_manage_scope(current_user, request.tenant_id)
     try:
         user_id = current_user.user_id
         logger.debug(
@@ -811,7 +827,7 @@ async def manage_update_model(
     Returns:
         Success message on successful update.
     """
-    _require_manage_role(current_user)
+    _require_manage_scope(current_user, request.tenant_id)
     try:
         user_id = current_user.user_id
         logger.debug(
@@ -863,7 +879,7 @@ async def manage_delete_model(
     Returns:
         Success message with deleted model name.
     """
-    _require_manage_role(current_user)
+    _require_manage_scope(current_user, request.tenant_id)
     try:
         user_id = current_user.user_id
         logger.debug(
@@ -908,7 +924,7 @@ async def manage_batch_create_models(
     Returns:
         Success message on completion.
     """
-    _require_manage_role(current_user)
+    _require_manage_scope(current_user, request.tenant_id)
     try:
         user_id = current_user.user_id
         logger.debug(
@@ -960,7 +976,7 @@ async def manage_list_models(
     Returns:
         Paginated model list for the specified tenant.
     """
-    _require_manage_role(current_user)
+    _require_manage_scope(current_user, request.tenant_id)
     try:
         logger.debug(
             f"Start to list models for tenant, user_id: {current_user.user_id}, target_tenant_id: {request.tenant_id}, "
@@ -1001,7 +1017,7 @@ async def manage_list_provider_models(
     Returns:
         List of available provider models for the specified tenant.
     """
-    _require_manage_role(current_user)
+    _require_manage_scope(current_user, request.tenant_id)
     try:
         logger.debug(
             f"Start to list provider models for tenant, user_id: {current_user.user_id}, target_tenant_id: {request.tenant_id}, "
@@ -1039,7 +1055,7 @@ async def manage_create_provider_models(
     Returns:
         List of available provider models for the specified tenant.
     """
-    _require_manage_role(current_user)
+    _require_manage_scope(current_user, request.tenant_id)
     try:
         logger.debug(
             f"Start to create provider models for tenant, user_id: {current_user.user_id}, target_tenant_id: {request.tenant_id}, "
diff --git a/test/backend/app/test_model_rbac.py b/test/backend/app/test_model_rbac.py
index adc3ff6c7..2cf806466 100644
--- a/test/backend/app/test_model_rbac.py
+++ b/test/backend/app/test_model_rbac.py
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
 
 Verifies that mutating /model/* endpoints reject the DEV role (which only
 holds model:read), read endpoints stay accessible to DEV, and the
-cross-tenant /manage/* endpoints are restricted to SU.
+/manage/* endpoints accept SU for any tenant plus ADMIN for its own tenant
+only.
 """
 
 import sys
@@ -185,9 +186,9 @@ async def test_admin_can_create_model(admin_client, mocker):
 
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_admin_cannot_access_manage_endpoints(admin_client, mocker):
-    """ADMIN shares the SU model seeds, so manage/* must fall back to the
-    SU role whitelist."""
+async def test_admin_cannot_access_foreign_tenant_manage_endpoints(admin_client, mocker):
+    """ADMIN shares the SU model seeds, so cross-tenant manage/* calls must be
+    rejected by the role+tenant scope check rather than by permission strings."""
     mocker.patch(
         'backend.apps.model_managment_app.list_models_for_admin',
         return_value={"models": [], "total": 0},
@@ -200,8 +201,86 @@ async def test_admin_cannot_access_manage_endpoints(admin_client, mocker):
     assert response.status_code == HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN
 
 
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_admin_cannot_mutate_foreign_tenant_models(admin_client, mocker):
+    """The own-tenant allowance must not extend to mutating endpoints either."""
+    mock_update = mocker.patch(
+        'backend.apps.model_managment_app.update_single_model_for_tenant',
+        return_value=None,
+    )
+    response = admin_client.post(
+        "/model/manage/update",
+        json={
+            "tenant_id": "other_tenant",
+            "current_display_name": "m",
+            "model_name": "m2",
+        },
+        headers=auth_header,
+    )
+    assert response.status_code == HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN
+    mock_update.assert_not_awaited()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_admin_can_list_own_tenant_models(admin_client, mocker):
+    """Tenant admins manage their own tenant via /resource-manage, which always
+    passes the caller's own tenant_id. Regression: manage/list used to be
+    SU-only, so the Models tab rendered an empty table for ADMIN."""
+    mock_list = mocker.patch(
+        'backend.apps.model_managment_app.list_models_for_admin',
+        return_value={"models": [], "total": 0},
+    )
+    response = admin_client.post(
+        "/model/manage/list",
+        json={"tenant_id": "rbac_tenant", "page": 1, "page_size": 10},
+        headers=auth_header,
+    )
+    assert response.status_code == HTTPStatus.OK
+    mock_list.assert_awaited_once()
+    # The own-tenant id must be the one forwarded to the service.
+    assert mock_list.await_args.args[0] == "rbac_tenant"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_admin_can_mutate_own_tenant_models(admin_client, mocker):
+    """Create/update/delete of the ADMIN's own tenant models stay available."""
+    mock_update = mocker.patch(
+        'backend.apps.model_managment_app.update_single_model_for_tenant',
+        return_value=None,
+    )
+    response = admin_client.post(
+        "/model/manage/update",
+        json={
+            "tenant_id": "rbac_tenant",
+            "current_display_name": "m",
+            "model_name": "m2",
+        },
+        headers=auth_header,
+    )
+    assert response.status_code == HTTPStatus.OK
+    mock_update.assert_awaited_once()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_dev_cannot_access_own_tenant_manage_endpoints(dev_client, mocker):
+    """DEV holds model:read and passes require(), so the scope check is the only
+    thing keeping it off the manage surface -- even for its own tenant."""
+    mock_list = mocker.patch(
+        'backend.apps.model_managment_app.list_models_for_admin',
+        return_value={"models": [], "total": 0},
+    )
+    response = dev_client.post(
+        "/model/manage/list",
+        json={"tenant_id": "rbac_tenant", "page": 1, "page_size": 10},
+        headers=auth_header,
+    )
+    assert response.status_code == HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN
+    mock_list.assert_not_awaited()
+
+
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_su_can_access_manage_endpoints(su_client, mocker):
+    """SU may target any tenant, including one that is not its own."""
     mocker.patch(
         'backend.apps.model_managment_app.list_models_for_admin',
         return_value={"models": [], "total": 0},